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Chapter 1
General Introduction
As can be well observed in the current financial crisis choosing the wrong
model specifications for making decisions or assessing risk can have very se-
vere consequences if the underlying theory is not robust to model uncertainty.
This seems to have been one of the major shortcomings which lead to the
present economic situation. Therefore a major aim in economics is to reduce
model risk by developing robust approaches to decision making.
A link between robust control theory and decision theory was shown in
[Hansen & Sargent, 01]. In robust control theory model uncertainty arises
by the perturbation of a unique approximating model. This corresponds to
uncertainty about the true distribution in a decision theoretical ansatz which
will be the focus of the following.
The well known works of [von Neumann & Morgenstern, 44], [Savage, 54]
and [Anscombe & Aumann, 63] are among the first theoretical models on
decision making. One common property of all these models however is that
they incorporate only one single known distribution of the outcomes, i.e.
what is often called a purely risky setting, which in reality is a situation
seldom found. The first comment on the fact that there is more than pure
risk can be found in [Knight, 21] which is why uncertainty about the true
distribution is often referred to as Knightian uncertainty but sometimes also
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as ambiguity.
1.1 Knightian Uncertainty
In his seminal paper [Knight, 21] suggested that there exist random outcomes
which cannot be represented by numerical probabilities, i.e. he establishes a
clear distinction between measurable uncertainty he calls risk and unmeasur-
able uncertainty. This unmeasurable uncertainty can among other reasons
arise when the decision-maker is ignorant of statistical frequencies relevant
to his decision or when a priori estimations are impossible to obtain or the
decision is unique in the sense that there is no information to build an ap-
proximation for numerical probabilities. To make this differentiation a bit
more explicit think of following examples. If one has to bet heads or tails
in a coin toss one would assume that both are equally likely based on one’s
experience, i.e. one can somehow measure the probability and finds oneself
in a pure risky setting. However if one is asked to bet on e.g. the outcome
of a tennis match without possessing any information about the players, it
is not clear how to assign a unique probability to the outcomes and one is in
an uncertain setting.
Based on this theoretical approach is the empirical work of [Ellsberg, 61].
Following the aim of giving evidence for Knight’s theory, he constructed the
following urn-experiment with two urns containing 100 black and red balls. In
the first urn the ratio of black to red is unknown, it can be anything between 0
and 100. In the second urn there are 50 red and 50 black balls. If one denotes
the bet of getting $100 if a red ball is pulled from urn i and $0 else by REDi,
and BLACKi for the respective bet on a black ball Ellsberg claims that a
majority of people show following preferences: They are indifferent between
REDi and BLACKi for i = 1, 2 but prefer RED2 to RED1 and BLACK2 to
BLACK1.
He shows that there is absolutely no way to assign probabilities to the
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event of red being pulled from the first urn, to explain these preferences im-
plying that the classical decision theory dealing with one unique distribution,
as e.g. introduced in [Savage, 54] cannot contain the whole truth and that
there do exist the unmeasurable uncertainties proposed by Knight.
An attempt to underpin these findings with a theoretical model is given
in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]. They set up axioms for preferences which lead
to Maxmin Expected Utility or the Multiple Priors Model. They weakened
the Independence Axiom of Anscombe and Aumann and introduced an ax-
iom formalizing Uncertainty Aversion to the model. By this slight change
they accomplished a representation of their preferences which instead of one
unique distribution contained a whole set of possible distributions. It leads
the decision maker to maximize infP∈C EP[u ◦ f ] among all possible acts f ,
where C is a non-empty set of distributions. Heuristically one can interpret
this as having the decision maker think all distributions in C possible and in
order to be on the safe side he always looks at the one which gives him the
lowest utility. If the utility under the worst possible distribution is enough
to make him choose act f surely it is high enough under all other distribu-
tions as well. Seen this way these preferences correspond to an extremely
conservative decision maker.
1.2 Time-Consistency
Since up to now the models were purely atemporal [Epstein & Schneider, 03]
generalized the above approach to a dynamic setting. They appropriately
modified the axioms of [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] to be not only state but
also time dependent and additionally asked for Dynamic Consistency in the
preferences. With this assumption they meant if two acts are identical up
to some time t but one is preferred over the other in t + 1 then this should
already be the case at time t implying that a decision maker will never regret
his earlier choices. This restriction on the preferences yields a very special
3
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property for the set of distributions in the Utility functional. They showed
that preferences are dynamically consistent if and only if the corresponding
set of distributions arising in their Recursive Multiple Priors Representation
is rectangular. Rectangularity is a restriction on the whole set of measures.
Equivalent definitions were formulated by various authors. A survey of the
different concepts and a proof of their equivalence can be found in [Riedel, 09]
and [Delbaen, 03]. Among these concepts is the above mentioned rectangu-
larity introduced in [Epstein & Schneider, 03] which is a property concerning
the one-step-ahead measures. They asked that at every point in time all pos-
sible one-step-ahead measures can be added. Another concept is stability
introduced in [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]. Here for two measures P and Q in the
set of measures and every stopping time τ the measure that takes P up to
τ and Q afterwards is also contained in the set. The last concept is time-
consistency which was introduced in [Delbaen, 03]. This property demands
that at every stopping time density processes can be consistently pasted to-
gether. It is also equivalent to a Law of Iterated Expectations meaning that
at time s my expected future payoff is the same as the expectation in s of
my future expected payoff in t ≥ s.
These may seem as rather technical assumptions but they also have some
intuitive consequences for the decision maker. He can for instance change his
mind in every time period about which measure he thinks is the true one or
the worst one and time-consistency guarantees that this measure is contained
in the set of his possible measures. This implies that as time passes he will
never regret his previous decisions since at every point in time he can decide
optimally. Another implication is that he can use backward induction for
solving problems which makes large classes of problem a lot more tractable.
One further generalization of these utility models is the variational pref-
erence model introduced in a static set up in [Maccheroni et al., 06a] and
extended to a dynamic framework in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. Since up to
now all distributions in the set were conceived as equally likely they intro-
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duced penalty functions allowing to differentiate the different distributions
according to their likelihood.
1.3 Risk Measures
Up to now we have focused on utility models that arise from preferences but
analogous models can also be found by axiomatizing risk measures.
Static coherent risk measures which correspond to the multiple prior
model under the assumption of risk neutrality, a discount factor of one
and no intermediate payoffs were first axiomatized in [Artzner et al., 99]
and their dynamic generalizations can inter alia be found in [Riedel, 04] or
[Artzner et al., 07]. The robust representation of a coherent risk measure is
identical to the one for multiple prior preferences up to a minus sign, having
the decision maker look at the largest expected loss as a basis for his decision.
Since for risk measures it is important to incorporate liquidity risk and
to give less conservative assessments which coherent risk measures cannot
provide convex risk measures were introduced and can e.g. be found in
[Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04] for a static setting. For a dynamic setting we refer
to [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] or [Fo¨llmer et al., 07] for risky projects seen as
payoffs in the last period while risky projects seen as stochastic processes are
studied in [Cheridito et al., 06]. Here again the equivalence to variational
preferences is given up to a minus sign.
Time-consistency concepts are the same in both approaches although in
terms of risk measures one usually works with the one corresponding to the
law of iterated expectations.
Considering this it makes no difference if we make the following observa-
tions in terms of utility functionals or risk measures. Each chapter may be
reformulated in terms of the other approach resrectively since for simplicity
we assume risk neutral decision makers without discounting in all chapters.
However in Chapter 2 and 3 we will look at utility functionals while Chapter
5
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4 will be mainly expressed in terms of risk measures where we will give a
further short overview of the theory of risk measures and their robust repre-
sentation.
1.4 Particular Considerations
The main chapters of this thesis, each of which is self-contained, are based
on three articles. The first deals with the construction or an alternative char-
acterization of time-consistent sets of measures in the special framework of
finite trees, the second shows as a main result a duality theorem this however
in a continuous time setting while the topic of the third one, coauthored by
Daniel Engelage is concerned with the merging of convex risk measures as
information is gained in the course of time.
In Chapter 2 we solve the question what time-consistent sets of measures
look like in finite trees. In [Riedel, 09] time-consistent sets of measures in a
discrete setting are constructed via their density processes which gave rise to
the question if all time-consistent sets can be constructed in this way. When
restricting the framework to finite trees with a constant and finite splitting
function we show that every time-consistent set of measures can be described
via predictable processes. For each measure P in a time-consistent set P we
get a predictable process αP whose dimension is one less than the splitting
value of the tree. The set of predictable processes A = {αP | P ∈ P} that
arises via this identification has specific features. These features in return
guarantee that a time-consistent set of measures can be created from a set
of predictable processes with these properties. After this characterization we
show some examples or applications for the use of this theorem. Additionally
we show that standard generalizations of this theorem fail to go through,
showing that our characterization is a universal one.
Chapter 3 contains a Duality theorem which allows to switch the or-
der of minimization and maximization in order to solve optimal stopping
6
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problems under ambiguity. This theorem is again set in the recursive mul-
tiple priors model of [Epstein & Schneider, 03] and works for fairly general
assumptions on our payoff process X and rather standard assumptions on
our set of measures P . We make strong use of an explicit but general con-
struction for time-consistent sets of measures given in [Delbaen, 03]. We also
apply this theorem to specific classes of payoff processes. It allows to deter-
mine an optimal stopping time for multiple prior super- and submartingales
as payoff processes and in the case of κ-ambiguity adapted to our framework
and a Brownian motion with drift as payoff process we are able to identify the
worst case distribution and hence our ambiguous stopping problems shrinks
to a classical problem.
In Chapter 4, coauthored by Daniel Engelage, we tackle the question
of how in an ambiguous environment the assessment of risk and with this
optimal behavior changes as time passes and information increases. The ve-
hicle for this analysis will be convex risk measures or dynamic variational
preferences equivalently. Our first approach to incorporate a kind of learning
mechanism into convex risk measures is a constructive one via the mini-
mal penalty function in the robust representation. However in our explicit
approach to construct the penalty via the likelihoods of the distributions
time-consistency seems to be a major problem. Therefore in our second ap-
proach we take a dynamically consistent set of risk measures as given and
show that in the long run all uncertainty is revealed, leaving the decision
maker behave as a utility maximizer under the true distribution. Formulat-
ing this result closer to the fundamental Blackwell-Dubins theorem of which
this is a generalization: two decision makers who agree on sure and impos-
sible events but with different opinions of the risk they face, modeled here
via different penalty functions, tend towards agreeing on the true under-
lying distribution in the end. As mentioned we extend the main result in
[Blackwell & Dubins, 62] which holds for probability measures to convex risk
measures. An important step in this generalization is also the extension to
7
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not necessarily time-consistent convex risk measures. With this our existence
result for a limiting distribution becomes more general than the one found
in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. To make things clearer we study entropic risk
measures as an application.
To this point we have given a brief outline of the general context and
developments which lead to this work. Since the questions and topics treated
in the following chapters differ a more detailed scientific placement of this
work will be discussed in each chapter separately.
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Chapter 2
Time-Consistent Sets of
Measures on Finite Trees
2.1 Introduction
In 1944 von Neumann and Morgenstern formulated their famous axioms for
preferences over random payoffs (see [von Neumann & Morgenstern, 44]) and
showed that these preferences are equivalent to an Expected Utility Repre-
sentation of preferences. After some time their model was criticized because
the distributions of their payoffs were exogenously given and purely objec-
tive. Since this is a very restrictive assumption their model was extended
in [Savage, 54] and in [Anscombe & Aumann, 63]. In contrast to the von
Neumann and Morgenstern model Savage regarded the distributions of the
payoffs to be purely subjective and endogenous. Anscombe and Aumann
then combined both models taking some objective distributions as given and
having others arising purely out of the model.
At some point criticism also arose against these models. One of the most
mentioned objections can be found in [Ellsberg, 61]. He conducted experi-
ments and empirically showed that Expected Utility models do not always
mirror reality. One way of explaining these findings is that people behave only
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boundedly rational. Another way is to distinguish between uncertainty and
risk. While in a risky setting the decision maker is sure of the distributions
of the outcomes in an uncertain setting he is unsure of the right distribution
and thinks more than one possible. Following this idea Gilboa and Schmei-
dler developed their Multiple Priors Model in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] us-
ing Anscombe’s and Aumann’s model as a basis. They weakened the In-
dependence Axiom and added an additional axiom formalizing Uncertainty
Aversion. This lead the decision maker to maximize inf
P∈C
EP[u ◦ f ] among all
possible acts f , where C is a non-empty, closed and convex set of probability
measures.
Since this is a purely atemporal model in [Epstein & Schneider, 03] the
Multiple Priors Model was expanded to incorporate the factor time. They
modified preferences to be not only state but also time-dependent, adjusted
the G-S-axioms appropriately and asked for Dynamic Consistency as an ad-
ditional axiom. This restriction on preferences yields a very specific property
of the set of measures in their Utility Representation. They found out that
preferences are dynamically consistent if and only if the set of measures in
their Recursive Multiple Priors Representation is rectangular. Rectangular-
ity is a restriction on the whole set of measures. It demands that it is possible
for the one-step-ahead measures to be mixed arbitrarily. Since for some pur-
poses (e.g. solving concrete optimal stopping problems) this is not a very
easy definition but never the less an important one it is very natural to try
and find equivalent definitions.
This was done by various authors. In [Riedel, 09] one can find a survey
of the different concepts and a proof of their equivalence. Among these
concepts is rectangularity which was introduced in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]
and is a property concerning the one-step-ahead measures. They asked that
at every point in time all possible one step ahead measures can be added.
Another concept is stability. It was introduced in [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04].
Here for two measures P and Q in the set of measures and every stopping
10
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time τ the measure that takes P up to τ and Q afterwards also lies in the set.
The last concept is time-consistency which was introduced in [Delbaen, 03].
This property demands that at every stopping time density processes can
be consistently pasted together. A more formal definition of this specific
property will be given in the next section.
In the above cited paper Riedel among other things constructed time-
consistent sets of measures via their density processes. Consequently the
question arose if in this special setting all time-consistent sets of measures
can be constructed in this way. That is why we took a closer look at time-
consistent sets of measures and found out that not quite all sets are of this
kind. However a slight modification of his construction does the trick.
The main content of this paper is this alternative characterization of time-
consistent sets. They are described via a set of predictable processes with
specific properties. This will be our first and main theorem. In addition to
showing how the set of measures can be related to this set of processes we
will also show that sets of processes with the assumed properties define sets
of time-consistent measures. This will be the content of our second theorem.
So altogether we will provide an equivalent formulation for time-consistent
sets of measures.
The build-up of this paper will be the following. After pinning down the
model framework and specifying the attributes of our sets more precisely in
Section 2.2 we will deduct the first theorem in the succeeding Section 2.3.
Then in Section 2.4 we will commit ourselves to proving the second theorem.
In the following fifth section we will introduce some example setting where our
results are applicable an might simplify calculations. After that we discuss
possible extensions in Section 2.6 and then conclude in the last and seventh
section.
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2.2 Model
To specify the setting we start with a discrete set Ω = {ω1, ..., ωk}. On this
state space we have an information structure {Ft}t=0,...,T with F0 = Ω and
FT = {{ω1}, ..., {ωk}}. This is a sequence of partitions of Ω, which become
finer as time progresses, i.e. every set of Ft+1 is a subset of some set of Ft
for all t.
Heuristically this concept describes the information of the prevailing state
available at a certain time t. This means for a fixed time t the decision maker
will not necessarily be able to observe the exact state which occurs but merely
which subset of Ft is realized. If the observed subset consists of only a single
state then of course the decision maker has full knowledge of the realization.
If you want to express this in terms of σ-fields and filtrations you just
take the power set Pot(Ω) for the filtration F and define the filtration {Ft}t
by setting Ft := σ(Ft) i.e. Ft is the set of atoms generating Ft.
For our considerations we assume our information structure to have a
constant and finite splitting function with splitting value ν. This implies
that if you draw the filtration as an information tree it will have the same
finite number of branches at every vertex. Formally the splitting function f
of an information structure {Ft}t is defined in the following way
f : Ω× [0,∞)→ N , f(ω, t) = ]{A ∈ Ft+1 | A ⊆ Ft(ω)}
where Ft(ω) is the set B ∈ Ft with ω ∈ B. The finiteness of this index
will allow us to apply the martingale representation given in Theorem 5.15
in [Dothan, 90] and the constancy will result in unique processes in the rep-
resentation. We will make these two things more precise in the following
section.
For now we will also restrict this model to a finite time horizon [0, T ].
The finite splitting index and the finite time horizon result in a finite Ω.
12
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To complete our probability space we still need to fix a probability mea-
sure P0 as a reference measure which pins down the sets of measure zero.
Since we are on a tree like structure any measure which assigns non-zero
probability to each branch will do, for simplicity let us choose the uniform
distribution.
The set of measures we want to characterize will be denoted by P . In
the following we will make some assumptions on this set and justify their
plausibility.
Our first assumption will be
Assumption 2.2.1. We assume P0 ∈ P and for all other measures P ∈ P
P(A) > 0 for all A ∈ FT
In this assumption P0’s function as a reference measure becomes clear.
One can see that it has no influence on the stochastic structure of the other
measures. It simply implies that all measures contained in P have the same
null sets which means that we know what sure and impossible events are.
In [Epstein & Marinacci, 06] an economic interpretation of this assump-
tion was given. They related it to an axiom on preferences first postulated
in [Kreps, 79]. He claimed that if a decision maker is ambivalent between
an act x and x ∪ x′ then he should also be ambivalent between x ∪ x′′ and
x∪x′∪x′′. Meaning if the possibility of choosing x′ in addition to x brings no
extra utility compared to just being able to choose x, then also no additional
utility should arise from being able to choose x′ supplementary to x ∪ x′′.
In our second assumption we claim
Assumption 2.2.2. P is time-consistent. This means for a stopping time
τ and densities pt :=
(
dP
dP0
)
t
and qt :=
(
dQ
dP0
)
t
belonging to P,Q ∈ P that the
measure P˜ defined by the density(
dP˜
dP0
)
t
=
{
pt if t ≤ τ
pτ qt
qτ
else
belongs to P as well.
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As mentioned in the introduction this assumption also originates from
a feature claimed for preferences introduced in [Epstein & Schneider, 03].
They expanded the Multiple Priors Model (cp [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]) to
a dynamic setting and asked the decision maker to be dynamically consistent
in his decisions. With this they meant that if two acts are identical up to
some time t but in t+ 1 the one is preferred over the other, then this should
already be the case at time t. This implies that a decision maker will never
regret his earlier decisions. In their paper Epstein and Schneider then showed
that preferences fulfill this requirement if and only if the utility functional
one obtains contains a rectangular set of measures. Rectangularity is equiv-
alent to time-consistency. Time-consistency was introduced in [Delbaen, 03]
where he also showed the equivalence to rectangularity. These two features
stand for being able to judge each period in time with a different measure.
More technically they allow to consistently paste together different densities
at different times and still stay in the set. They also make it possible to
use backward induction in discrete settings and allow for a Law of Iterated
Expectations.
The set used to characterize P will be denoted by A. We will show that
it consists of predictable processes, is compact and that the process constant
to zero is contained in it. Furthermore we will see that it fulfills a property
we call stable under pasting and define in the following way.
Definition 2.2.3. A set of processes A is called stable under pasting if for
every stopping time τ and all processes (αt)t, (βt)t ∈ A the process defined by
γt :=
{
αt if t ≤ τ
βt else
belongs to A as well.
Later on we will show if we assume these properties for a set A then we
can derive a set of measures P that features our original characteristics.
14
2.3. FROM P TO A
2.3 From P to A
The goal of this section is to prove the main theorem of this paper, which
tells us, that every time-consistent set of measures in our setting can also be
described via a set of predictable processes fulfilling certain properties.
Expressed more formally this results in
Theorem 2.3.1. For every set of measures P satisfying Assumptions 2.2.1,
2.6.1 and 2.2.2 there is a set of predictable processes A such that
P =
{
P
∣∣∣ ( dP
dP0
)
t
= E˜t(α) , α ∈ At, t ∈ {0, ..., T}
}
where
E˜t(α) = exp
(
t∑
s=1
ν−1∑
h=1
αhs∆mhs −
t∑
s=1
lnE
[
exp
(
ν−1∑
h=1
αhs∆mhs
)])
The A resulting from each P inhabits following features:
• 0 ∈ A
• A is compact.
• A is stable under pasting.
In order to prove this theorem we will derive a set of predictable processes
A for every time-consistent set P and then show that it inhabits the requested
features. One important step along this way will be a martingale representa-
tion theorem which we will explain more thoroughly in the next subsection.
After that we will show the construction of the processes starting with an
arbitrary time-consistent set of measures satisfying the above assumptions.
Following this we will show that the constructed processes really are what
we asked for.
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2.3.1 Martingale Representation
This important tool which we will use in our proof tells us that in our setting
we can find a set of martingales with which we can represent every other
martingale in our setting with the help of predictable processes. A set of
martingales which has this representation property is called a martingale
basis. More formally we define
Definition 2.3.1. A finite set of martingales {m1t}, ..., {mkt} is called a basis
iff for every martingale {xt} there are predictable processes {α1t}, ..., {αkt}
such that for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T
xt = x0 +
k∑
h=1
T∑
s=1
αhs∆mhs where ∆mhs = mhs −mh,s−1
If the martingales {m1t}, ..., {mkt} are pairwise orthogonal, i.e. for every
1 ≤ j ≤ k , 1 ≤ h ≤ m , j 6= h and every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , 〈mj,mh〉t = 0, then
the basis {m1t}, ..., {mkt} is called orthogonal.
For our purposes it would be good to know in which cases such a basis
exists especially with unique α’s. An answer for this is provided by the
following proposition. A slightly different version of this can be found in
[Dothan, 90] but since we are looking for a unique representation we need
to restrict the setting to a constant splitting function of our information
structure. The proof is works along the same line as the one in [Dothan, 90].
Proposition 2.3.2. (Martingale Representation)
Given a discrete space Ω = {ω1, ..., ωk} which is endowed with an information
structure {Ft}t=0,...,T with F0 = Ω and FT = {{ω1}, ..., {ωk}} and a constant
splitting function with value ν. Then there exists an orthogonal martingale
basis m1t, ...,mν−1,t for which the predictable processes {αx1t}, ..., {αxν−1,t} in
the representation of every {xt} are unique.
Remark 2.3.3. Since under the assumption of “no arbitrage” discounted
assets are martingales for a martingale measure P∗ this means for a binomial
16
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tree setting that there is one asset Mt with which every other asset Xt can
be replicated and therefore hedged. More general in an n-nomial tree we can
replicate every asset with a set of n− 1 many assets.
2.3.2 Exponential form of the densities
The next step we will take is to show that every measure P ∈ P can be
uniquely related to predictable processes
(
αP1s
)
s
, ...,
(
αPν−1,s
)
s
.
Remark that this is exactly one process less than our splitting value ν.
The equivalence of the measures in addition to P0 ∈ P (Ass.2.2.1) gives us
the possibility to identify each P ∈ P uniquely with its density with respect
to P0.
If you define
(
dP
dP0
)
t
:= E
[(
dP
dP0
) ∣∣∣
Ft
]
for every t ≤ T and every P ∈ P
with the expectation taken under P0 you obtain density processes which are
P0-martingales.
Using Jensen’s inequality and Doob’s decomposition theorem each of the
above densities can be written in the following form where (Mt)t is also a
P0-martingale and (At)t is a non-decreasing and predictable process with
A0 = 0 (
dP
dP0
)
t
= exp(Mt − At).
Now applying the martingale representation theorem to Mt we obtain an
orthogonal martingale basis (m1s)s , ..., (mν−1,s)s. This implies that there are
predictable processes
(
αP1s
)
s
, ...,
(
αPν−1,s
)
s
such that our densities can now be
written in the following manner where ∆mhs = mhs −mh,s−1
(
dP
dP0
)
t
= exp
(
t∑
s=1
ν−1∑
h=1
αPhs∆mhs − At
)
.
Now we still have to determine the At’s. Using the martingale property of the
densities and the measurability of the At’s we receive the following recursive
17
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relation
At+1 − At = lnE
[
exp
(
ν−1∑
h=1
αPh,t+1∆mh,t+1
) ∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
.
This results in
At =
t∑
s=1
(As − As−1) =
t∑
s=1
lnE
[
exp
(
ν−1∑
h=1
αPhs∆mhs
) ∣∣∣∣ Fs−1
]
.
Additionally thanks to the assumptions on our information structure, we
can show that our filtration is generated by our martingale basis and this in
addition to the predictability of the α’s allows us to drop the conditioning
on Fs−1.
So for our density
(
dP
dP0
)
t
we now have following representation(
dP
dP0
)
t
= exp
(
t∑
s=1
ν−1∑
h=1
αPhs∆mhs −
t∑
s=1
lnE
[
exp
(
ν−1∑
h=1
αPhs∆mhs
)])
.
(2.1)
This construction now allows us to not only identify a measure P with its
density with respect to P0 and the associated density process but also with
the predictable processes in the above representation
(
αP1s
)
s
, ...,
(
αPν−1,s
)
s
.
Consequently it gives us a mapping from our density processes to sets of
predictable processes.
For notational convenience and in resemblance to a stochastic exponential
we will denote the right hand side of (2.1) as E˜t(αP) seeing αP = (αP1 , ..., αPν−1)
as a ν − 1-dimensional process.
So now if we denote the set of processes generated via this construction
and the densities up to time t by
At :=
{(
αP1,s, ..., α
P
ν−1,s
)
s∈{0,...,t} | P ∈ P
}
and
Dt :=
{((
dP
dP0
)
1
, ...,
(
dP
dP0
)
t
)
| P ∈ P
}
we have constructed a mapping E˜−1t : Dt → At.
From this construction and from the assumption that P0 ∈ P we directly
conclude that the α’s are predictable and that 0 ∈ A := AT .
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2.3.3 Compact-valuedness of the α’s
One further thing we want to show is that the compactness of the densities
resulting from P implies compactness ofA. The compactness onAt is defined
via the norm ||α||t,L1 := max
s∈{0,...,t}
||αs||L1 .
This is a straight forward consequence of our assumptions and the pre-
ceding construction. In the construction of the α’s every step was unique
thanks to our assumptions. A density with respect to a designated measure
uniquely characterizes a measure, the same is true for the construction of
our density processes. Doob’s decomposition is also unique and since we as-
sumed a finite and constant splitting function the martingale representation
also delivers unique predictable processes once the martingale basis is fixed.
All in all the set of α’s that belongs to one P is unique. Additionally a set of
α’s provides exactly one density and through that uniquely one measure. For
this reason our E˜t gives us a bijective mapping from the set of predictable
processes At to our set of densities Dt. This mapping is also continuous
since the elements of our martingale basis are bounded thanks to the finite
splitting index.
Since this also implies a continuous mapping between the densities and
the predictable processes, the compactness on one side carries over to the
other.
2.3.4 Stability under Pasting
The final property we claimed for our processes is stability under pasting.
This property however follows directly from the assumption that P is time-
consistent. To make this more clear for (αPt )t, (α
Q
t )t ∈ A and a stopping time
τ ≤ T define
βt :=
{
αPt if t ≤ τ
αQt else
19
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Our aim now is to show that this process lies in A, i.e. that there exists a
P∗ ∈ P such that
(
dP∗
dP0
)
t
= E˜t(β). If we plug β into Equation (2.1) and define
P∗ by (
dP∗
dP0
)
t
:=
{
E˜t(αP) if t ≤ τ
E˜t(αQ)E˜τ (αP)
E˜τ (αQ) else.
we notice that β ∈ A is equivalent to P∗ ∈ P . The fact that P∗ ∈ P however
follows directly from our assumption of time-consistency.
If we now combine the above propositions we have shown Theorem 2.3.1.
2.4 Necessity
Now let us look at the conversion of the theorem above. The goal of this
section will be to show that every A with the above properties defines a
time-consistent set of measures. So we see that the properties of A are not
only sufficient but also necessary. For this purpose we will derive a set of
measures P from a given set A of predictable processes which are assumed
to be compact-valued and stable under pasting. Additionally we claim that
A contains the process constant to zero. Our goal will be to verify that the
derived P satisfies the assumptions made in the model specifications.
Formally this will lead to following theorem
Theorem 2.4.1. For every set of predictable processes A that satisfies the
properties shown in Theorem 2.3.1 there exists a set of measures P, such that
A =
{
α
∣∣ ( dP
dP0
)
t
= E˜t(α) , P ∈ P
}
.
Every P constructed in this way has the following properties:
• P0 ∈ P and P ∼loc P0 for all P ∈ P
• P is compact
• P is time-consistent.
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2.4.1 Construction of P
If we use the same identification as in part 2.3.2 between the processes
(αt)t∈{0,...,T} and the densities we are able to construct a density process((
dPα
dP0
)
t
)
t
for every α ∈ A.
From the construction it follows immediately that the obtained processes
are P0-martingales with expectation 1 and since the they are clearly strictly
larger than zero they are indeed density processes.
Let us define our new set of measures by
P :=
{
P
∣∣∣∣ dPdP0
∣∣∣
Ft
= E˜t(α) for α ∈ A
}
.
Since the process α ≡ 0 is assumed to be an element of A we get that
P0 ∈ P . From the fact that all P ∈ P are constructed via density processes
with respect to P0 that are strict positive we can also directly conclude that
our measures are all equivalent to our reference measure.
2.4.2 Time-Consistency
As when showing that we can derive A from P time-consistency in our set P
is equivalent to stability under pasting in our set A and thus this property
follows instantly from our assumptions.
2.4.3 Compactness of densities
Here again the fact that the E˜ is a bijective and continuous mapping is the
reason why the compactness of the α’s implies compactness of the densities.
And again summarizing the above propositions leads us to the proof of
Theorem 2.3.1.
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2.5 Examples
In this section we introduce some examples for which this result is applicable
and might simplify calculations.
2.5.1 Binomial Tree
The most basic example one can think of in this setting is a binomial tree.
It has a constant and finite splitting index of two. Here things are still very
basic to calculate. One can for instance show that a convex set of priors
results in a convex set of processes and vice versa which is in general not true
for a higher splitting index. Put more formally we have
Proposition 2.5.1. On a binomial tree every convex set of measures fulfill-
ing Assumptions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, i.e. P = {(p1, ..., pT ) |pt ∈ [pt, pt] for all
t = {0, ..., T}}, is equivalent to the respective processes lying in a predictable
interval [at, bt], where pt = P [Xt = up |Ft−1].
Proof. For the proof we will work ourselves through the tree successively for
every time period t.
Starting with t = 1 the density for a fixed P takes following form
dP
dP0
∣∣∣
F1
(up) = 2p =
2 exp(α∆m1(up))
exp(α∆m1(up)) + exp(α∆m1(down))
this can be transformed to
α = ln
(
1− p
p
)
(m1(down)−m1(up))−1
which is a function that is monotone and continuous in p. So if p ∈ [p, p]
then this results in boundaries a, b which are F0-measurable s.t. α ∈ [a, b].
One can show the conversion by the same argumentation since the above
formula can be converted to a function p(α) which is also monotone and
continuous in α. Therefore a convex set of α’s gives us a convex set of
probabilities [pt, pt] where pt = infP∈P
P[Xt = up |Ft−1].
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This can easily be extended to further time periods by just looking at the
one step ahead measures or densities in an analogous way.
[Chudjakow & Vorbrink, 09] present applications of this to american ex-
otic options on a binomial tree.
2.5.2 Exponential Families
A further example for expressing time-consistent sets of measures via pre-
dictable processes was given in [Riedel, 09]. He introduced what he calls
dynamic exponential families which is the discrete version of κ-ambiguity in
[Chen & Epstein, 02] but with predictable bounds.
He starts with a probability state space (S,S, ν0) with S ⊂ Rd. With this
he constructs a probability space with (Ω,B, (Ft)t=1,...,T , P0), where
• Ω = ST
• B = ⊗Tt=1 S σ-field generated by all projections t : Ω→ S
• (Ft) generated by the sequence (t)
• P0 =
⊗T
t=1 ν0 probability s.t. t iid with distribution ν0
Then by assuming that
∫
S
eλ·xν0(dx) <∞ the log-Laplace function L(λ) =
log
∫
S
eλ·xν0(dx) is well defined and with the help of predictable processes
(αt)t he then defines densities on (Ω,B, (Ft)t,P0) via
Dαt := exp
(
t∑
s=1
αss −
t∑
s=1
L(αs)
)
.
Then for fixed predictable processes a < b one gets a set of densities which
defines a time-consistent set of measures by setting
Pa,b =
{
P
∣∣ ( dP
dP0
)
t
= Dαt , α ∈ [a, b]
}
.
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2.5.3 Trinomial Tree
The purpose of the following example is to show that switching between these
two representations does not work too well in general. Starting with a two
period trinomial tree which means we have a state space Ω = {s1, ..., s9} and
the information structure F0 = Ω , F1 = {{s1, s2, s3}, {s4, s5, s6}, {s7, s8, s9}}
and F2 = {{s1}, ..., {s9}} we define the rather simple time-consistent set
P =
{(
1
3
+ ,
1
3
+ δ,
1
3
− − δ
) ∣∣∣ , δ ∈ (−1
3
,
1
3
)
and + δ 6= 1
3
}
.
We then construct a martingale basis in this tree with respect to the uniform
distribution and then show what this set looks like expressed via predictable
processes and our basis.
A martingale basis {m1t}, {m2t} in this case is given by
m1 m2
and
1
−1
3
2
−4
2
1
−1
−3
−1
0
1
0
−1
2
2
−1
−2
−3
2
−1
2
1
−2
1
0
Figure 2.1: Martingale Basis
If we now calculate the processes that belong to each of the measures
above we obtain
for t = 1 and i = 1, ..., 9
α11(si) =
1
2
ln
1 + 3
1− 3δ − 3 and α
2
1(si) =
1
3
ln
(1 + 3)(1− 3− 3δ)
1 + 3δ
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and for t = 2
α12(si) =

1
4
ln 1−3−3δ
1+3δ
for i = 1, 2, 3
1
6
ln
√
(1−3−3δ)(1+3)
1+3δ
for i = 4, 5, 6
1
4
ln 1+3
1−3−3δ for i = 7, 8, 9
α22(si) =

1
3
ln
√
(1−3−3δ)(1+3δ)
1+3
for i = 1, 2, 3
1
2
ln 1+3
1−3−3δ1 + 3δ for i = 4, 5, 6
1
3
ln
√
(1+3)(1−3−3δ)
1+3δ
for i = 7, 8, 9
.
As one can see a comparably simple set in the one representation can become
relatively complicated in the other.
2.5.4 DTV@R
Another important area in which time-consistent sets of measures have been
studied are risk measures. In [Artzner et al., 99] it is shown that every coher-
ent risk measure ρt has a robust representation involving a set of measures
P , i.e.
ρt(X) = ess infP∈P
EP [X | Ft] .
Then in [Artzner et al., 07] it was shown that the family of dynamic risk
measures ρ = (ρt)t is dynamically consistent iff the set P is time-consistent.
[Roorda & Schumacher, 05] introduce dynamically consistent tail value at
risk (DTV@R) as one of these time-consistent risk measures.
As the set P they take all measures P for which the one step ahead
densities with respect to the reference measure P0 are bounded by 1λ where
λ ∈ (0, 1] is the usual risk level. If we want to describe this in our character-
ization it gives us
E˜t(α)
E˜t−1(α)
= exp (αt ·∆mt − lnE [exp (αt ·∆mt)]) = exp (αt ·∆mt)E [exp (αt ·∆mt)] ≤
1
λ
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for all t = 1, ...T and all α ∈ A.
This allows to characterize the set A as soon as the martingale basis is
fixed.
2.6 Possible Extensions
In this section we will discuss poaaible extensions which arise quite naturally.
2.6.1 Convexity
Since time-consistent sets are often used in optimization problems convexity
of the sets is often assumed. It would be nice if this feature would carry over
to the processes. Unfortunately this is not the case in general, as can be seen
in the following counterexample.
Take for example a trinomial tree with states s1, s2 and s3 and just one
time period. As a reference measure we will fix
P0(s1) =
1
2
, P0(s2) =
1
4
and P0(s3) =
1
4
.
A second measure will be given by
Q(s1) =
1
2
, Q(s2) =
1
8
and Q(s3) =
3
8
.
The density of Q with respect to P0 will then be
dQ
dP0
(s1) = 1 ,
dQ
dP0
(s2) =
1
2
and
dQ
dP0
(s3) =
3
2
.
Since we want to show that from a convex set of measures a non-convex
set of processes can arise, let us define our set of measures via
P := convH {P,Q} .
Then let us look at the set of processes A arising from this convex set, espe-
cially αP0 and αQ. Now ifA were a convex set, then every convex combination
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of αP0 and αQ has to be an element of A. Since αP0 is zero, because we chose
P0 as our reference measure we look at 12α
Q. If we now calculate the associ-
ated density to this process, we see that it can never originate from a convex
combination of our original measures and therefore 1
2
αQ /∈ A and hence A is
not convex.
2.6.2 Infinite Horizon
When extending our statements to an infinite time horizon let us first remark
that our model assumptions can all be transferred without complications.
We will however need a further assumption on our set of measures. This
assumption will be
Assumption 2.6.1. The family of densities for a fixed t
Dt :=
{
dP
dP0
∣∣∣
Ft
| P ∈ P
}
is weakly compact in L1(Ω,F ,P0).
Technically this assumption ensures that when looking at expressions of
the following kind inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] the infimum is always attained for bounded
stopping times τ . (cp. [Riedel, 09])
[Arrow, 71] already gives an economic interpretation of this property by
claiming a feature of preferences which is related to this assumption in
[Chateauneuf et al., 05]. The condition we need to ask of the preferences
to obtain this feature is called Monotone Continuity. It means that if an act
f is preferred over an act g then a consequence x is never that bad that there
is no small p such that x with probability p and f with probability (1− p) is
still preferred over g. The same is true for good consequences mixed with g.
Critics tend to object to this assumption by saying that if the probability
of dying is added to the better act f then surely the preferences have to
be reversed. However if we take f for getting 100 dollars and g for getting
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nothing then having to drive 60 miles to get the 100 dollars and so adding a
small probability of getting killed will normally not reverse the preferences.
Expressed formally this means for acts f  g, a consequence x and a
sequence of events {En}n∈N with E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ... and ∩n∈NEn = ∅ there exists
an n¯ ∈ N such that
[
x if s ∈ En¯
f(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
 g and f 
[
x if s ∈ En¯
g(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
.
The construction of the processes can also be maintained, since they are
always constructed for a fixed time horizon up to a time t. That is also the
reason why the mapping from our densities to our processes still inhabits
the same features, i.e. it is continuous and bijective. Therefore in this case
the compactness also carries over from one side to the other. It is also clear
that stability under pasting is equivalent to time-consistency for an infinite
horizon as well. So altogether our statements can smoothly be converted
from a finite to an infinite time horizon.
2.6.3 Looser Assumptions on Splitting Function
Since our assumptions on the filtration are very restrictive, it would be nice
if they could be relaxed in one way or another.
One way would be to give up the assumption of a constant splitting
function. In this case however you run into the problem that the α’s that
arise from the martingale representation are no longer unique and with that
the mapping no longer distinct and bijective.
A second way is allowing for the splitting value to become infinite. This
however has the consequence that the martingale representation will not
necessarily exist anymore.
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2.7 Conclusions
For our special setting, i.e. discrete and with special assumptions on the
information structure, we have constructed an alternative characterization
for time-consistent sets of measures. We have shown that all sets of time-
consistent sets of measures can be expressed by predictable processes and
vice versa.
As can be seen in the extensions standard generalizations fail to work. So
as far as I am concerned this is the most generalization that can be formulated
in this setting.
For practical applications we have shown that for problems which can be
modeled in the form of decision trees (with a constant number of branches
e.g. trinomial trees) we now know what a time-consistent set of measures
must look like expressed via predictable processes which might simplify cal-
culations. So hopefully our construction will be helpful in the future e.g. for
solving Optimal Stopping Problems which can be modeled in this framework.
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Chapter 3
A Duality Theorem for
Optimal Stopping Problems
under Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Many investment problems arising in Economics, Finance or general Decision
Theory do not have a fixed point in time when the decision must be made
but a time period in which the choice of investment is possible. Especially if
the decision is irreversible which means the investment cannot be recovered
without considerable losses optimal timing is crucial. Important examples for
these kind of investments are the market entry time of a firm, the optimal
time to install a new technology or the exercise strategy of an American
option but also at what bid to sell a house or which job offer to accept. This
class of problems is called optimal stopping problems.
Each of these problems can be modeled by optimally trying to stop a
stochastic process (Xt)t which describes the future random payoffs. Clas-
sical decision theory (e.g. [von Neumann & Morgenstern, 44]) proposes to
2. DUALITY THEOREM
maximize the expected payoff under a given distribution, i.e.
maximize E[Xτ ] among all stopping times τ .
But what if the distribution of (Xt)t is not (exactly) known or one is
unsure about its true form. In this case the current literature on what is
called ambiguity or uncertainty aversion often reverts to the multiple prior
model introduced in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] for the static case and in
[Epstein & Schneider, 03] for a dynamic setting. They propose to look at
a whole set of possible distributions and to take the worst expected value as
a foundation of decision-making, i.e.
maximize inf
P∈P
EP[Xτ ] among all stopping times τ
where P is a set of measures with specific properties.
One reason this way of modeling decisions emerged was that empirical
studies e.g. [Ellsberg, 61] gave substantial evidence that decision makers not
only inhabit risk aversion but also uncertainty aversion.
What is the difference between risk and uncertainty? When talking about
risk one means the randomness that is inherent in a given and fixed distribu-
tion while uncertainty or ambiguity describes a further source of randomness
which springs from lacking knowledge of the correct distribution. This no-
tion was first introduced in [Knight, 21], and hence is also often referred to
as Knightian Uncertainty.
This ansatz can further be motivated using the framework of incomplete
markets where the equivalent martingale measure is no longer unique and
therefore one obtains a whole set of measures. Alternatively one can think
of the set of measures being slight variations of the measure one thinks
the right one, this corresponds to testing the robustness of a model (cp.
[Hansen & Sargent, 01]).
The question we now want to study is, can the order of minimizing over
the distribution and maximizing via the stopping time be switched. Since
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for several optimal stopping problems the classical solution, i.e. with one
fixed and known distribution, is well studied the duality can be helpful in
solving these problems under uncertainty. Therefore the main objective of
this work is to study under what conditions it is possible to first maximize
over all stopping times and then minimize over the distributions. Expressed
more formally we will prove the following duality theorem
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP[Xτ ] = infP∈P supτ∈S
EP[Xτ ].
Remark 3.1.1. This problem can also be seen as a stochastic game between
two players, while one player is the “maximizer” picking an optimal stop-
ping time the second is the “minimizer” choosing the distribution. What our
theorem then shows is that it is irrelevant in which order they make their
decisions since the “value” process of this game is always the same.
In this paper we prove in a rather general setting a minimax theorem for
optimal stopping problems in continuous time under Knightian uncertainty
and deduce an optimal stopping rule. More precisely for mild assumptions on
the payoff process X (i.e. right continuous, class of P-D, upper semicontin-
uous, adapted and an a.s. finite optimal stopping time) and rather standard
assumptions on P (i.e. absolute continuity, weak compactness of densities
and time-consistency) we obtain that
ess sup
τ≥t
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] = ess infP∈P ess supτ≥t E
P [Xτ |Ft]
and that an optimal stopping strategy is given by
ρ∗0 = inf{s ≥ 0| ess sup
τ≥s
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Fs] = Xs}.
We also show that this stopping time is the minimum of all optimal stopping
rules for the classical solutions, i.e.
ρ∗0 = infP∈P
ρP0 , where ρ
P
0 = inf{s ≥ 0| ess sup
τ≥s
EP[Xτ |Fs] = Xs}.
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A great help in the proof of the main theorem is an explicit but general
construction for time-consistent sets of measures introduced in [Delbaen, 03]
and briefly reviewed in Section 3.4. He shows that every convex and time-
consistent set of measures can be expressed with the help of a convex valued
correspondence. He also shows that starting with a martingale and a convex
valued corespondence, one can construct a convex and time-consistent set of
measures.
In addition to the theorem with its implications we apply the results to
special classes of payoff processes. First we look at the case where (Xt)t is
either a multiple prior sub- or supermartingale, which leads to stopping at
the last possible period if there is a finite time horizon for the submartingale
or to stopping immediately in case of the supermartingale. After that we
show how the theorem helps identify the worst case distribution in an adap-
tion of κ-ambiguity1 introduced in [Chen & Epstein, 02]. This allows for the
ambiguous stopping problem to be transformed into a classical one.
Discrete versions of the theorem can be found in [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]
and [Riedel, 09] who also presents applications. In [Karatzas & Kou, 98] one
can find the continuous time case for a finite time horizon and a strong
focus on trading constraints. Unlike their paper we explicitly include the
infinite time horizon and embed the explicit construction for all sets of time-
consistent sets of measures introduced in [Delbaen, 03] into the proof.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section the
model will be discussed in more detail and the assumptions we make justified.
After that the problem that is to be solved is elaborated more thoroughly
in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 contains a constructive description of the time-
consistent sets we look at including the adapted version of κ-ambiguity. The
succeeding Section 3.5 contains the proof of our main theorem which we apply
1Since we are going to look at problems with an infinite time horizon and the classical
version of κ-ambiguity fails to satisfy the Novikov condition in T = ∞ we need to adapt
this concept a bit.
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to different stopping problems in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
As a foundation for our model we begin with the filtered probability space(
Ω,F ,P0, (Ft)t∈[0,∞]
)
, where the filtration satisfies the usual assumptions,
also F0 is trivialand F the σ-field generated by the union of all Ft. We will
denote the class of all stopping times τ of the filtration (Ft)t which satisfy
P0(τ <∞) = 1 by S and those that are larger than or equal to a t ∈ [0,∞)
by St := {τ ∈ S |τ ≥ t}.
Further let (Xt)t∈[0,∞] be a right continuous and adapted process describ-
ing the payoff from stopping. Our decision maker’s task is to choose a stop-
ping time τ of the filtration (Ft)t. If he chooses the stopping rule τ he gains
the payoff Xτ (ω) = Xτ(ω)(ω) for ω ∈ Ω . His goal is to maximize his expected
reward. Since our model is placed in an ambiguous setting our decision maker
is uncertain about the true distribution of X. In order to capture the decision
maker’s uncertainty aversion we will use the Recursive Multiple Prior Model
introduced in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. As a consequence he considers a set
of probability distributions P on (Ω,F) which he all assumes possible and
his (minimax) expected reward for stopping in τ is given by
inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] . (3.1)
Remark 3.2.1. For simplicity we will only look at risk neutral decision mak-
ers. Plus we will not explicitly mention discounting or a special utility func-
tion.
Since the expected payoff should be well-defined for all possible stopping
times we introduce following notion of class P −D and assume this property
for X.
Definition 3.2.2. We say a right-continuous process {Xt,Ft; 0 ≤ t <∞} is
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of class P −D if
sup
P∈P
sup
τ∈S
EP [|Xτ |] <∞ and
lim
K→∞
sup
P∈P
sup
τ∈S
∫
|Xτ |>K
|Xτ | dP = 0.
Remark 3.2.3. This property is a uniform integrability condition for am-
biguous settings. We not only ask for uniform integrability under a fixed
distribution P0 but under a whole set P. However we only look at stopping
times τ and not at the whole time set.
A further property we want to assume for the payoff process X is upper
semicontinuity.
Definition 3.2.4. A stochastic process X is upper semicontinuous in ex-
pectation from the left with respect to the probability measure P0 if for any
increasing sequence of stopping times {τi}∞i=1 converging to τ , we have
lim sup
i→∞
EP0 [Xτi ] ≤ EP0 [Xτ ].
This ensures that the lower Snell envelope
V· = ess infP∈P
ess sup
τ∈S·
EP[Xτ | F·]
has a cadlag modification with the important consequence that for the stop-
ping times ρt := inf{s ≥ t | Xs = Vs} one actually obtains Vρt = Xρt . A
thorough discussion of these results along with a different approach to The-
orem 3.5.1 can be found in [Trevin˜o, 09].
For the set P we will also make some assumptions. First of all, for mainly
technical reasons we assume
Assumption 3.2.5. P0 ∈ P and all other measures P ∈ P are absolutely
continuous with respect to P0, i.e. P(A) = 0 if P0(A) = 0 for all A ∈ F .
Additionally we will ask for P to be convex, i.e. for λ ∈ (0, 1) and Q,P ∈ P
we have λQ+ (1− λ)P ∈ P .
36
3.2. MODEL
This assumption merely lets P0 fix some sets of measure zero and serve as
a reference measure. This has no influence on the stochastic structure of the
other measures. It simply implies that all measures contained in P have at
least the same null sets as P0 which economically translates to the decision
maker knowing some sure and impossible events. Technically it allows us
to identify each measure P ∈ P with its Radon-Nikodym density dP
dP0 with
respect to P0.
The second part of the assumption assures that the set satisfying the
more stringent constraint of mutual continuity, i.e. Pe := {Q ∈ P | Q ∼ P0}
lies dense in P since each Q ∈ P can be approximated by elements in λQ+
(1 − λ)P0 ∈ Pe. Therefore we achieve the same behavioral implications for
our optimal stopping problem.
For the assumption of mutual continuity an interpretation was given in
[Epstein & Marinacci, 06]. They related it to an axiom on preferences first
postulated in [Kreps, 79]. He claimed that if a decision maker is ambivalent
between an act x and x∪x′ then he should also be ambivalent between x∪x′′
and x ∪ x′ ∪ x′′. Meaning if the possibility of choosing x′ in addition to x
brings no extra utility compared to just being able to choose x, then also no
additional utility should arise from being able to choose x′ supplementary to
x ∪ x′′.
The second assumption for our set P will ensure that the infimum in
(3.1) is always attained for bounded stopping times τ (cp. [Riedel, 09]). We
assume
Assumption 3.2.6. The family of densities
D :=
{
dP
dP0
| P ∈ P
}
is weakly compact in L1(Ω,F ,P0).
An economic interpretation of this property was given by [Arrow, 71] in
claiming a feature of preferences which was related to this assumption in
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[Chateauneuf et al., 05]. The condition we need to ask of the preferences to
obtain this feature is called Monotone Continuity. It means that if an act f
is preferred over an act g then a consequence x is never that bad that there
is no small p such that x with probability p and f with probability (1− p) is
still preferred over g. The same is true for good consequences mixed with g.
Critics tend to object to this assumption by saying that if the probability
of dying is added to the better act f then surely the preferences have to
be reversed. However if we take f for getting 100 dollars and g for getting
nothing then having to drive 60 miles to get the 100 dollars and so adding a
small probability of getting killed will normally not reverse the preferences.
Expressed formally this means for acts f  g, a consequence x and a
sequence of events {En}n∈N with E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ... and ∩n∈NEn = ∅ there exists
an n¯ ∈ N such that[
x if s ∈ En¯
f(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
 g and f 
[
x if s ∈ En¯
g(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
.
3.3 Problem
The question we want to study in the above setting is how to solve optimal
stopping problems of the following form
maximize inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] over all stopping times τ ∈ S.
If P is singleton the problem reduces to subjective expected utility and
the solution is well-known. We know an optimal solution is given by
τ ∗ = inf
{
s ≥ 0 | Xs = sup
τ∈Ss
E [Xτ | Fs]
}
see for example [El Karoui, 81]. As we will see later on the solution to our
problem including uncertainty is very similar to this one.
In a discrete setting the problem was studied in [Riedel, 09]. He shows
that with an added condition on P he attains following optimal stopping
38
3.3. PROBLEM
time as a result for the problem
τ ∗ = inf {s ≥ 0 | Xs = Us} , where Us = ess sup
τ∈Ss
ess inf
P∈P
E[Xτ | Fs].
He also shows that under this extra assumption and with a finite time horizon
Us can be obtained recursively by setting
UT = XT and Us = max
{
Xs, ess infP∈P
EP[Xs+1 | Fs]
}
∀s = 0, ..., T−1.
This important condition on P is called time-consistency. It is a crucial
assumption for making dynamically consistent decisions. In the discrete set-
ting for instance it allows the use of backward induction. More general it
implies following version of the law of iterated expectations:
ess inf
P∈P
E
[
ess inf
P∈P
E [Xτ | Ft] | Fs
]
= ess inf
P∈P
E [Xτ | Fs] for t ≥ s.
This can be interpreted in the following way, if the decision maker settles for
the stopping rule τ then his expected return at time s is the same as the
expectation in s of what he would get if he chose τ in t.
A technical formulation of this property can be found in the following
final assumption on our set P .
Assumption 3.3.1. P is time-consistent. This means that for every stop-
ping time τ and every pair P1,P2 ∈ P with density processes p1t = dP
1
dP0 and
p2t , respectively, the measure Q defined by the density process
dQ
dP0
∣∣∣
Ft
=
{
p1t if t ≤ τ
p1τp
2
t
p2τ
else
belongs to P as well.
Further implications or equivalent definitions can inter alia be found in
[Delbaen, 03] or [Riedel, 09].
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3.4 Construction of P
As is typical for these models we will use our first assumption on P , the ab-
solute continuity, to describe our set of measures since it allows us to identify
each measure with its density function with respect to the reference measure
P0. A further useful and well-known fact is that for a given martingale (Mt)t
with respect to P0 and (Ft)t densities can be generated by predictable pro-
cesses since the stochastic exponential E(θ ·M) describes a density if it is a
non-negative martingale.
Remark 3.4.1. As a reminder for a semimartingale X with X0 = 0 the
stochastic exponential is defined in the following way:
Et(X) = exp
(
Xt − 1
2
[X,X]t
) ∏
0<s≤t
(1 + ∆Xs) exp
(
−∆Xs + 1
2
(∆Xs)
2
)
where ∆X = Xs −Xs− and the infinite product converges.
In [Delbaen, 03] one can find a thorough study of such constructions,
he shows that under certain assumptions time-consistent sets can always be
represented in this way and gives a description of what the set of densities
will look like. More explicit he proves for every convex and time-consistent
set of densities P containing the reference measure P0, that if there exists a
continuous martingale (Mt)t such that for all measures P ∈ Pe there exists
a predictable process θ such that EP0
[
dP
dP0
∣∣∣Ft] = Et(θ · M) , then there
exists a predictable, convex correspondence C : R+ × Ω → B(Rd) such that
0 ∈ C(t, ω) for all (t, ω) and such that
P = cl Pe with Pe =
{
Pθ | dP
θ
dP0
= E(θ ·M) with θ ∈ Θ
}
where
Θ = { θ | θ is a predictable process with θ(t, ω) ∈ C(t, ω),
s.t. E(θ ·M) is a positive uniformly integrable martingale }
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and the closure is taken with respect to the L1 norm on the space of the
density processes.
Remark 3.4.2. The uniform integrability of the stochastic exponential guar-
antees that the arising distributions are absolutely continuous with respect to
P0 and the positivity, i.e. E∞(θ ·M) > 0, even guarantees equivalence.
Remark 3.4.3. Two important examples for these kind of sets are the ex-
treme constructions where C(t, ω) = {0} and C(t, ω) = Rd. In the first case
P = {P0}, i.e. singleton, and in the second case P is the set of all absolutely
continuous probability measures whose densities have the appropriate form.
Remark 3.4.4. Delbaen also shows the conversion of the theorem used above
to describe our set. He shows that for a martingale M and a predictable
convex correspondence C : R+ × Ω → B(Rd) satisfying 0 ∈ C(t, ω) for all
(t, ω) and that the projection of C onto the predictable range of M is closed2
we can construct a time-consistent convex set of measures.
3.4.1 κ-Ambiguity
An explicit example for the construction of such a set on the probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞],P0) is given in the following. It is strongly related
to κ-ambiguity introduced in [Chen & Epstein, 02], but since the classical
definition does not fulfill the Novikov condition in T =∞ we need to slightly
adapt it.
Fix a P0-martingale (Mt)t∈[0,∞] and the set of predictable processes
Θ :=
{
(θt)t∈[0,∞] | θ predictable process with |θt| ≤ κt
}
where κt =
{
1 t ≤ 1
1
t2
else.
2This assumption is made in order to deal with those density generators θ that are not
identically zero but are such that θ ·M is zero. It guarantees that the elements lying in the
closure of the constructed set that are equivalent to P0 also have the form of a stochastic
exponential. For more details we again refer to [Delbaen, 03].
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Here C(t, ω) = [−κt, κt] is a predictable and convex correspondence with
0 ∈ C(t, ω) for all (t, ω).
Using the analysis found in [Czichowsky & Schweizer, 09] it follows that
the projection of C onto the predictable range of M is closed and since κt
tends to zero fast enough to fulfill the Novikov condition we get the posi-
tivity and the uniform integrability of the stochastic exponential. Therefore
Theorem 1 in [Delbaen, 03] tells us that the L1-closure of
Pe =
{
Pθ
∣∣∣ dP
dP0
= E(θ ·M), θ ∈ Θ
}
is a time-consistent and convex set.
The set P = cl Pe is also a weakly compact set, since it is weakly closed,
uniformly integrable, and bounded hence it is a set fulfilling all our assump-
tions.
Remark 3.4.5. When constructing time-consistent sets in a setting with
an infinite time horizon in this fashion one needs to consider that many
martingales known to us when t ∈ [0,∞[ no longer satisfy the martingale
condition when t = ∞ is included. A prominent example for this is the
geometric Brownian motion.
3.5 Main Part
Before we come to the main theorem of the paper let us make sure the con-
ditional expectations we will speak about are properly, i.e. P0-a.s., defined.
Since our sets of measures constructed with the help of [Delbaen, 03] are con-
vex we know that every measure Q << P0 can be approximated by measures
Qn ∼ P0. Hence Pe lies dense in P and we define
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] := ess infP∈Pe E
P [Xτ |Ft] .
To simplify notations we will define the value function of stopping under
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the worst case measure by
Ut := ess sup
τ∈St
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] ,
the value function of the interchanged problem by
Vt := ess infP∈P
ess sup
τ∈St
EP [Xτ |Ft]
and for fixed P we define
UPt := ess sup
τ∈St
EP [Xτ | Ft] .
The equations are all to be understood P0-almost surely. Additionally we
will ask for the stopping times ρt := inf{s ≥ t | Xs = Us} to be P0-almost
surely finite for all t <∞.
The main statement of this paper is the following Duality Theorem which
can help solve optimal stopping problems in the above model since it allows
to interchange the infimum and supremum.
Theorem 3.5.1. For X,F and P satisfying the above claims we get
Ut := ess sup
τ∈St
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] = ess infP∈P ess supτ∈St
EP [Xτ |Ft] =: Vt
Remark 3.5.1. As is always the case with statements of duality one inequal-
ity is trivial. So in our case we only have to show that the left hand side is
greater than or equal to the right hand side.
Proof of the theorem. The proof will consist of two claims leading to the
main statement. The first claim is
Claim 1:
Vt = ess infP∈P
EP [Xρt|Ft] for all 0 ≤ t <∞,
where ρt = inf{s ∈ [t,∞) | Xs = Vs}
and from this claim the theorem results at once.
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In order to prove this claim first observe that ρs ∈ S and we immediately
obtain that the l.h.s. is greater than or equal to the r.h.s. The opposite
inequality remains to be shown.
To do so, we propose
Claim 2:
Vs ≤ EQ [Vρ|Fs] for all Q ∈ P and stopping times s ≤ ρ ≤ ρs
This immediately yields the first claim by setting ρ = ρs.
Remark 3.5.2. In the following the explicit construction of the set of mea-
sures as described in Section 3.4 will play a very prominent role. Instead of
directly working with the distributions, we can restrict ourselves to the density
generators.
We start the proof of the second claim by first fixing an arbitrary measure
Q ∈ P whose density process regarding P0 is E(θ·M)t. Now look at a sequence
{θk}k∈N where θk ∈ Θ for all k and all θk coincide with θ on the stochastic
interval [[s, ρ]] and which suffices following convergence
lim
k→∞
ess sup
τ∈St
EPk [Xτ | Ft] = Vt,
where Pk denotes the measure with the density E(θk ·M).
For such a sequence to exist we need to show that the set
Φ := {ess sup
τ∈St
EP [Xτ | Ft] | P ∈ P}
is directed downwards, i.e. for all φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ we have that φ1 ∧ φ2 ∈ Φ. This
follows at once from Lemma 17 of [Delbaen, 03], where he shows that
Φ˜ := {EP [Xτ | Ft] | τ ≥ t is a stopping time and P ∈ P}
is a lattice.
Remark 3.5.3. In the respective proof one can see that time-consistency is
a crucial assumption here.
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This sequence is dominated by ess supP∈P ess supτ∈St E
P [Xτ | Ft], which
is Q-integrable due to X being of class P − D. Now applying the Domi-
nated Convergence Theorem and using the facts that the stopped process(
UPt∧ρs
)
t≥s is a P-martingale for ρ
P
s = inf{u ≥ s |Xu = UPu} (cp e.g.
[Karatzas & Shreve, 98]) and ρt ≤ ess infP∈P ρPt (cp subsequent lemma) we
get the second claim through
EQ [Vρ | Fs] = EQ
[
lim
k→∞
ess sup
τ∈Sρ
EPk [Xτ | Fρ]
∣∣ Fs]
= lim
k→∞
EQ
[
ess sup
τ∈Sρ
EPk [Xτ | Fρ]
∣∣ Fs]
= lim
k→∞
EPk
[
ess sup
τ∈Sρ
EPk [Xτ | Fρ]
∣∣ Fs]
≥ ess inf
P∈P
EP
[
UPρ
∣∣ Fs] = EP∗ [UP∗ρ∧ρs |Fs]
= UP
∗
s∧ρs ≥ ess infP∈P ess supτ∈Ss
EP [Xτ | Fs]
= Vs
where P∗ denotes the minimizing P in the foregoing equation.
To complete the proof we still need to show
Lemma 3.5.4. Defining
• ρt := inf{s ≥ t | Xs = Vs} and
• ρPt := inf{s ≥ t | Xs = UPs }
then it holds that ρt ≤ ρPt for all P ∈ P.
Proof. We know following equations hold almost surely for all P ∈ P
1. Xs < Vs and Xρt = Vρt for all t ≤ s < ρt
2. Xs < U
P
s and XρPt = U
P
ρPt
for all t ≤ s < ρPt
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3. Vs ≤ UPs for all s ∈ [0,∞]
Now if we assume ρt > ρ
P
t it follows from 1 and 2 that
VρPt > XρPt = U
P
ρPt
which clearly contradicts 3 and therefore ρt ≤ ρPt for all P.
Intuitively this means our “worst case” decision maker has a more pes-
simistic apprehension of the future than the other investors and hence he
values the expected payoff lower. So he is more likely to accept what he has
earlier because he expects less in the future.
With the help of the theorem we can now immediately show that the ρt in
the proof gives us a solution to our optimal stopping problem and we obtain.
Corollary 3.5.5. (i) U is the smallest multiple prior supermartingale with
respect to P that dominates X.
(ii) An optimal stopping rule is given by ρ∗0 = inf {s ≥ 0|Us = Xs} .
Proof. We first show that (Ut)t∈[0,∞] is a multiple prior supermartingale.
For t ≥ s we have
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Ut |Fs] = ess infP∈P E
P
[
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xρt |Ft] |Fs
]
= ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xρt |Fs] ≤ ess sup
τ∈Ss
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Fs] = Us.
Remark 3.5.6. The second equality is again due to our time-consistency
assumption.
Next we show that it is the smallest multiple prior supermartingale domi-
nating X. For this assume that W is another multiple prior supermartingale
dominating X, then it holds that
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] ≤ ess infP∈P E
P [Wτ |Ft] ≤ Wt ∀τ ∈ St
46
3.6. APPLICATIONS
and in particular
Ut = ess sup
τ∈St
ess inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ |Ft] ≤ Wt.
The last thing we want to show is the optimality of ρ∗0, this follows directly
with the help of the first claim in the proof, since
inf
P∈P
EP
[
Xρ∗0
]
= V0 = U0 = sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] ≥ infP∈P E
P [Xτ ] ∀τ ∈ S.
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Sub- and Supermartingales
With the help of this theorem we want to solve optimal stopping problems.
Two straightforward examples are if the payoff process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is either a
multiple prior sub- or supermartingale.
In the case of the multiple prior submartingale which means
ess inf
P∈P
EP[Xt |Fs] ≥ Xs for all t ≥ s
we can show that
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] = infP∈P E
P[XT ].
This means it is optimal to wait until the very last period to stop and the
expected payoff is the expected payoff in the last period under the worst case
measure.
To see why this is true first of all remark that thanks to the optional
sampling theorem
EP[XT ] = EP[EP[XT |Fs]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥Xs
] ≥ EP[Xs]
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for all stopping times s ≤ T and fixed P since multiple prior submartingales
are submartingales for all P ∈ P .
Therefore supτ∈S EP[Xτ ] = EP[XT ] for all P and we get
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] = infP∈P supτ∈S
EP [Xτ ] = infP∈P E
P[XT ]
and with that the above statement.
In the case of a multiple prior supermartingale it turns out that stopping
immediately is optimal. Since X being a multiple prior supermartingale
means
ess inf
P∈P
EP[Xt |Fs] ≤ Xs for all t ≥ s
we get
inf
P∈P
EP[Xτ ] ≤ X0 ∀τ ∈ S
and obtain that stopping immediately is optimal.
3.6.2 Exploiting Monotonicity in the Drift
In the following let µ, σ, θ : R+×R→ R be continuous, bounded and adapted
functions. For convenience we abbreviate the functions µ(t,Xt), σ(t,Xt) and
θ(t,Xt) by µt, σt and θt. Let b
θ = µ+ θσ fulfill a Lipschitz condition, i.e.
|bθt (x)− bθt (y)| ≤ K|x− y| for a positive constant K.
On top of this let σ satisfy |σ| ≥  > 0 and
|σt(x)− σt(y)| ≤ h(|x− y|)
where h :]0,∞[→]0,∞[ is a strictly increasing function with h(0) = 0 and∫
(0,)
h−2(u)du =∞ ∀ > 0.
Falling back on the example for constructing time-consistent sets via our
adaption of κ-ambiguity in Section 3.4.1 we will in this section show how the
theorem helps identify the worst case measure in this set in the case of a
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Brownian motion with drift as payoff process. With this we mean that our
payoff process has following dynamics
dXt = µ(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dW
0
t
where W 0 is a Brownian Motion with respect to our underlying probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t,P0).
So the problem we want to study is
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP[Xτ ]
for the above X and the P from Section 3.4.1. For simplicity we will restrict
ourselves to one dimensional processes giving us the advantage that we can
use a comparison theorem for our drifts later on.
The first step in our analysis will be to transfer the ambiguity imple-
mented by our set of measures onto the process, we want to stop. The main
tool for this can be found in the theory of weak solutions for stochastic dif-
ferential equations (SDEs) and Markov processes (e.g. cp [Revuz & Yor, 91]
and [Shiryayev, 78]).
If a SDE has two weak solutions
(X i,W i), (Ωi,F i, (F it )t,Pi) for i = 1, 2 with X1 = X2 = x,
meaning in our case that
dX it = µ(t,X
i
t)dt+ σ(t,X
i
t)dW
i
t
where W i is a Brownian motion with respect to (Ωi,F i, (F it )t,Pi) for i = 1, 2,
then we know that X1 and X2 have the same law, i.e.
P1[X1 ∈ Γ] = P2[X2 ∈ Γ] for Γ ∈ B(C(R+)) .
In our case this means if we define a further auxiliary process (Xθt )t via
dXθt = (µt + θtσt)dt+ σtdW
0
t
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then with the help of Girsanov’s theorem and the construction of our mea-
sures we get that for W θ being the Pθ-Brownian motion defined by
W θt = W
0
t −
∫ t
0
θsds
where θ ∈ Θ is one of the density generators from Section 3.4.1 that
(X,W θ), (Ω,F , (Ft)t,Pθ) and (Xθ,W 0), (Ω,F , (Ft)t,P0)
are both weak solutions to the same SDE and therefore
Pθ[X ∈ Γ] = P0[Xθ ∈ Γ] for Γ ∈ B(C(R+)) .
This equality now allows us to shift the ambiguity from the set of measures
to the payoff process since (Xt)t together with (Ω,F , (Ft)t,Pθ) is a Markov
process and hence
s(t, x) = sup
τ≥t
EPθ [Xτ | Xt = x]
is the smallest excessive majorant of the function g(z) = z and with respect
to the process X.
Remark 3.6.1. Since we are looking for the optimal stopping time from the
beginning, we set t = 0 and drop it in the following.
We also know the smallest excessive majorant of g(x) with respect to X
can be approximated by
v(x) = lim
n
lim
N
QNn g(x),
where QNn g(x) is the N
th power of of the operator Qn defined via
Qng(x) = max{g(x), T2−ng(x)}.
Remark 3.6.2. The operator Qn reminds of backward induction since g(x)
is the payoff of stopping and T2−ng(x) =
∫
g(y)Pθ(2−n, x, dy) is the expected
payoff in t = 2−n.
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This is now where the uniqueness in law from above comes in since it
implies
Pθ(2−n, x, dy) := Pθ(X2−n ∈ dy |X0 = x)
= P0(Xθ2−n ∈ dy |Xθ0 = x) = P0(2−n, x, dy).
Implying since (Xθt )t together with (Ω,F , (Ft)t,P0) is also a Markov process
that the smallest excessive majorants in both settings are identical and we
have
sup
τ∈S
EPθ [Xτ | X0 = x] = sup
τ∈S
EP0 [Xθτ | X0 = x]
which allows to shift the uncertainty of the distribution of X to uncertainty
of the true drift of X via
sup
τ∈S
inf
Pθ∈P
EPθ [Xτ | X0 = x] = sup
τ∈S
inf
θ∈Θ
EP0 [Xθτ | Xθ0 = x] for all x ∈ Ω.
The construction of Section 3.4.1 now tells us that
µt + θtσt ≥ µt − κtσt
for all θ ∈ Θ, meaning that µt − κtσt is the smallest possible drift our pay-
off process can have and with a comparison result for stochastic differential
equations we obtain that
P0
[
Xθt ≥ X−κt for all t ≥ 0
]
= 1
and with that
sup
τ∈S
inf
θ∈Θ
EP0
[
Xθτ
]
= inf
θ∈Θ
sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
Xθτ
]
≥ inf
θ∈Θ
sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
X−κτ
]
= sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
X−κτ
]
.
Since the converse inequality follows directly from the theorem
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] = infP∈P supτ∈S
EP [Xτ ] = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
Xθτ
] ≤ sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
X−κτ
]
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we obtain that the theorem helps us identify the worst case distribution in
this case and our ambiguous stopping problem is simplified into a classical
stopping problem with a known distribution, i.e.
sup
τ∈S
inf
P∈P
EP[Xτ ] = sup
τ∈S
inf
θ∈Θ
EP0 [Xθτ ] = sup
τ∈S
EP0
[
X−κτ
]
= sup
τ∈S
EP−κ [Xτ ] .
3.7 Conclusion
Confronted with an optimal stopping problem and not (exactly) knowing
or being unsure of the true distribution of the payoff process X we find
ourselves in the framework of [Epstein & Schneider, 03] who propose to solve
the following problem
maximize inf
P∈P
EP [Xτ ] among all stopping times τ
where P is the set of all measures we think possible. Here we asked if and
under what conditions it is possible to interchange the order of minimizing
over the distributions and maximizing over all stopping times. The result is
a minimax theorem under rather general assumptions on the payoff process
X and standard assumptions on the set of measures P . It incorporates
an explicit but still universal construction given in [Delbaen, 03] for time-
consistent sets of measures.
This theorem allows us to identify the optimal stopping time for payoff
processes which are multiple prior sub- or supermartingales and have a finite
investment horizon. It also helps us determine the worst case distribution in
the setting of κ-ambiguity for options with an increasing payoff in the un-
derlying and with this turns our ambiguous decision problem into a classical
purely risky one.
It would be desirable to find further applications of this theorem. Since
the crux of applying this theorem is mainly a minimization over the drift it
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would be preferable to find classical solutions that depend on the drift of the
payoff process. However the drift has to be stochastic and since in classical
solutions the drift is commonly assumed constant for simplicity, it might be
a good idea to look at processes in a setting with stochastic interest rates.
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Chapter 4
Learning for Convex Risk
Measures with Increasing
Information
4.1 Introduction
Reaching decisions concerning risky projects in a dynamic system, an agent
faces new information consecutively influencing her assessment of risk instan-
taneously.
In this article, we answer the question how anticipation of risk evolves
over time when an agent gathers information. We show that, in the limit, all
uncertainty is revealed but risk remains if the agent perceives risk in terms
of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures and, hence, generalize the
famous Blackwell-Dubins Theorem to convex risk measures. We then relax
the time-consistency assumption and show the result to still be valid. Hereto,
a fundamental assumption is existence of a reference distribution that fixes
impossible and sure events by virtue of equivalence of distributions under
consideration.
Coherent risk measures were introduced by virtue of an axiomatic ansatz
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in [Artzner et al., 99] in a static setting and have been generalized to a dy-
namic framework in [Riedel, 04]. Tangible problems in this setup are inter
alia discussed in [Riedel, 09]. The equivalent theory of multiple prior prefer-
ences in a static setup is introduced in [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]; a dynamic
generalization is given in [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. Applying coherent risk
measures substantially decreases model risk as they do not assume a spe-
cific probability distribution to hold but assume a whole set of equally likely
probability models. Moreover, they possess a simple robust representation.
However, as they assume homogeneity, coherent risk measures do not ac-
count for liquidity risk. Though in financial applications, the Basel II accord
requires a “margin of conservatism”, coherent risk measures are far too con-
servative when estimating risk of a project as they result in a worst case
approach. Furthermore, popular examples of risk measures, as e.g. entropic
risk, are not coherent.
Hence, it seems worthwhile to consider a more sophisticated axiomatic
system: [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04] introduce convex risk measures as a gener-
alization of coherent ones relaxing the homogeneity assumption. Equiva-
lently, [Maccheroni et al., 06a] generalize multiple prior preferences to varia-
tional preferences. Convex risk measures are applied to a dynamic setup in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for a stochastic payoff in the last period or, equiva-
lently, in [Maccheroni et al., 06b] in terms of dynamic variational preferences.
[Cheridito et al., 06] applies dynamic convex risk measures to stochastic pay-
off processes. Given a set of possible probabilistic models, convex risk mea-
sures are less conservative than coherent ones. Dynamic convex risk measures
as well as dynamic variational preferences possess a robust representation in
terms of minimal penalized expectation. The minimal penalty, serving as
a measure for uncertainty aversion, uniquely characterizes the risk measure
or, respectively, the preference. Conditions on the minimal dynamic penalty
characterize time-consistency of the dynamic convex risk measure.
A parametric learning model in an uncertain environment for dynamic co-
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herent risk measures or, equivalently, dynamic multiple priors as introduced
in [Epstein & Schneider, 03], is elaborated in [Epstein & Schneider, 07]. The
main virtue of this article is to introduce learning based on experience to
convex risk measures models. First, we try to introduce learning in a con-
structive approach: we design a minimal penalty function and plug it into
the robust representation: Since the penalty might be seen as some inverse
likelihood of a specific prior distribution, we first apply a quite simple and
intuitive learning mechanism to the penalty. We calculate the likelihood of
a distribution given past experience and use this as updated penalty. The
intuition behind this approach is quite simple: observing good events, dis-
tributions of a payoff process that are “stochastically more dominated”, i.e.
put more weight on bad events, become more unlikely, i.e. have a higher
penalty. However, besides its intuitive appeal, it turns out that this proce-
dure does not result in a penalty function as it is backwards oriented and a
penalty function, by definition, incorporates probability distributions of the
future movement of the payoff process. In a second, more sophisticated ap-
proach, we model a penalty incorporating projections of “past” likelihoods on
future distributions. Here, we make use of the conditional relative entropy
as penalty function: we achieve a proper penalty that penalizes distributions
according to “distance” from the “most likely” distribution serving as refer-
ence distribution. However, the convex risk measure in terms of this penalty
turns out not to be time-consistent in general as shown by a counterexample.
In [Epstein & Schneider, 07], time-consistency is not an issue as multiplicity
of priors is not introduced in terms of multiple equally likely distributions of
the payoff process as e.g. in [Riedel, 09] or [Maccheroni et al., 06a], but in
terms of multiple distributions on the parameter space.
Our further approach is not constructive but takes the robust representa-
tion of a risk measure in terms of minimal penalty for granted. As the main
result of this article we achieve a generalization of the famous Blackwell-
Dubins Theorem in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62] from conditional probabilities
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to time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures. We pose a condition on
the minimal penalty in the robust representation, always satisfied by coherent
risk measures, forcing the convex risk measure to converge to the conditional
expected value under the true underlying distribution. Intuitively, this re-
sult states that, eventually, the uncertain distribution is revealed or, in other
words, uncertainty diminishes as information is gathered but risk remains.
The agent, as she has learned about the underlying distribution, is again
in the framework of being an expected utility maximizer with respect to the
true underlying distribution. We have hence achieved learning as an intrinsic
property of dynamic convex risk measures.
Our generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem serves as an alterna-
tive approach to limit behavior of time-consistent dynamic convex risk mea-
sures as the one in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. The result particularly states the
existence of a limiting risk measure. As an example we consider dynamic
entropic risk measures or, equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences. We,
however, show a Blackwell-Dubins type result to hold, even if we relax the
time-consistency assumption. Again, we obtain existence of a limiting risk
measure but in a more general manner than [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for not
necessarily time-consistent convex and coherent risk measures.
[Schnyder, 02] discusses H.P. Minsky’s theory of financial instability, a
huge portion of which is caused by herding on financial markets. Besides,
herding is usually one of the major objections towards Basel II. Our result
however shows that, in the long run, there is hardly any chance to circumvent
herding behavior.
The article is considered in a parametric setting. However, the second part
can be restated in a non parametric setting. It is structured as follows: The
next section formally introduces the underlying probabilistic model. Section
4.3 elaborately discusses robust representation of dynamic (time-consistent)
convex risk measures. Constructive approaches to learning in terms of dy-
namic minimal penalty as well as their shortcomings are stated in Section
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4.4. Section 4.5 generalizes the Blackwell-Dubins Theorem to conditional ex-
pectations. The following two sections then apply this result to coherent and
convex risk measures first in the time-consistent case and then in the case
without time-consistency. Section 4.8 states examples. Then we conclude.
4.2 Model
For our model we start with a discrete time set t ∈ {0, ..., T} where T is an
infinite time horizon. We will now construct an underlying filtered reference
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t,Pθ0) and define risky projects X:
We fix (S,A) as a measurable space where S describes the possible states
of the world at a fixed point in time t and define Ω to be all possible states
of the world, formally the set of sequences of elements of S. For this let
St = S for all t ∈ {0, ..., T} and then define Ω :=
⊗T
t=0 St. On this space
let F be the product σ-field generated by all projections pit : Ω → St and
let the elements of the filtration Ft be generated by the sequence pi1, ..., pit.
Additionally define all sequences up to time t by Ωt :=
⊗t
s=0 Ss. Denote
generic elements on these spaces by st ∈ St, s ∈ Ω, and st ∈ Ωt.
Let Θ be a set of parameters where every θ ∈ Θ uniquely defines a distri-
bution Pθ on (Ω,F) with filtration (Ft)t and fix Pθ0 as a reference distribution
which can be seen as the true distribution of the states. For all θ ∈ Θ, Pθ
is assumed to be equivalent to Pθ0 . Let Me(Pθ0) denote the set of all distri-
butions on (Ω,F) equivalent to Pθ0 . Assume that all these can be achieved
by parameters θ ∈ Θ, i.e. Me(Pθ0) = {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ}. For Pθ ∈ Me(Pθ0) let
Pθ(·|Ft) denote the distribution conditional on Ft. Due to our assumption
to only consider distributions equivalent to Pθ0 , the reference distribution
merely fixes the null-sets of the model, i.e. distinct agents at least agree on
impossible and sure events. This assumption has no influence on the stochas-
tic structure of the distributions it just tells the decision makers what sure
or impossible events are. An economic interpretation of this assumption was
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given by Epstein and Marinacci in [Epstein & Marinacci, 06]. They related
it to an axiom on preferences first postulated by Kreps in [Kreps, 79]. He
claimed that if an agent is ambivalent between an act x and x ∪ x′ then he
should also be ambivalent between x ∪ x′′ and x ∪ x′ ∪ x′′. Meaning if the
possibility of choosing x′ in addition to x brings no extra utility compared to
just being able to choose x, then also no additional utility should arise from
being able to choose x′ supplementary to x ∪ x′′.
Furthermore we define X : Ω → R to be an F -measurable random vari-
able which can be interpreted as a payoff at final time T . Assume X being
essentially bounded with ess sup |X| = κ > 0. Having constructed the fil-
tered reference space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,Pθ0) as above, the sets of almost surely
bounded F -measurable and Ft-measurable random variables are denoted by
L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,Pθ0) and L∞t := L∞(Ω,Ft,Pθ0), respectively. All equations
have to be understood Pθ0-almost surely.
Remark 4.2.1. As we will see in course of the article, the parametric set-
ting is only needed in the first part on the constructive approach to learn-
ing. All statements in the second part, the generalization of the Blackwell-
Dubins theorem, can be posed in terms of an arbitrary underlying filtered
space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P0) with distributions in Me(P0), where P0 denotes the
reference distribution, i.e. in a non-parametric setting. Moreover, for these
results, we do not need the particular structure of Ω in terms of a product of
marginal spaces St. We however follow the parametric approach throughout
to obtain a unified appearance.
4.3 Dynamic Convex Risk Measures
In this article, we apply the theory of convex risk measures as set out in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] for end-period payoffs. For payoff processes, convex
risk measures are described in [Cheridito et al., 06]. We do not consider
the axiomatic approach to convex risk but take the robust representation
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of dynamic convex risk measures or, equivalently, of dynamic variational
preferences as given.
Definition 4.3.1 (Dynamic Convex Risk & Penalty Functions). (a) A family
(ρt)t of mappings ρt : L
∞ → L∞t is called a dynamic convex risk measure if
each component ρt is a conditional convex risk measure, i.e. for all X ∈ L∞,
ρt can be represented in terms of
ρt(X) = ess sup
Q∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EQ [−X| Ft]− αt(Q)
)
,
where (αt)t denotes the dynamic penalty function, i.e. a family of mappings
αt : Me(Pθ0) → L∞t , αt(Q) ∈ R+ ∪ ∞, closed and grounded. For technical
details on the penalty see [Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04].
(b) Equivalently, we define the dynamic concave monetary utility function
(ut)t by virtue of ut := −ρt, i.e.
ut(X) := ess inf
Q∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EQ [X| Ft] + αt(Q)
)
.
Remark 4.3.2. (a) By Theorem 4.5 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], the above
robust representation in terms of Me(Pθ0) is sufficient to capture all time-
consistent dynamic convex risk measures.
(b) Assuming risk neutrality but uncertainty aversion, no discounting, and no
intermediate payoff, (ut)t is the robust representation of dynamic variational
preferences as introduced in [Maccheroni et al., 06b]. In this sense, all our
results also hold equivalently for dynamic variational preferences. However,
we have chosen to concentrate on dynamic convex risk measures here.
Assumption 4.3.3. In the robust representation, we assume the penalty αt
to be given by the minimal penalty αmint . The minimal penalty is introduced
in terms of acceptance sets in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], p.64: For every Q ∈
Me(Pθ0)
αmint (Q) := ess sup
X∈L∞:ρt(X)≤0
EQ [−X| Ft] .
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As stated in the respective references, every dynamic convex risk mea-
sure (ρt)t can be expressed in terms of the above robust representation,
uniquely by virtue of the minimal penalty and vice versa. The notion of
minimal penalty is justified by the fact that every other penalty represent-
ing the same convex risk measure a.s. dominates the minimal one, cp.
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]’s Remark 2.7. Throughout, we assume a represen-
tation in terms of the minimal penalty (αmint )t.
Remark 4.3.4 (Equivalent Notation). In our parametric set-up, a distribu-
tion Pθ of the process is uniquely defined by a parameter θ ∈ Θ. Hence, we
write
ρt(X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
(
EPθ [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ)
)
.
Further assumptions on the risk measure under consideration will be
posed when necessary.
Remark 4.3.5 (On Coherent Risk). As set out in the references, the robust
representation of coherent risk is a special case of the robust representation
of convex risk when the penalty is trivial, i.e. for all t it holds
αt(θ) =
{
0 if Pθ(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft),
∞ else
for Q˜ the set of prior distributions induced by all θ in some set Θ˜ ⊂ Θ.
Throughout, Q˜ is assumed to be convex and weakly compact or, equivalently,
Θ˜ is assumed to be such.
The following definition is a major assumption needed in order to solve
tangible economic problems under convex risk.
Definition 4.3.6 (Time-Consistency). A dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t
is called time-consistent if, for all t, s ∈ N, it holds
ρt = ρt(−ρt+s)
or, equivalently, ut = ut(ut+s).
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Remark 4.3.7. For the special approach here, [Cheridito et al., 06] show
that it suffices to consider s = 1 in the above definition.
Remark 4.3.8. As inter alia shown in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Theorem
4.5, time-consistency of (ρt)t is equivalent to a condition on the minimal
penalty (αmint )t called no-gain condition in [Maccheroni et al., 06b].
We now introduce a special class of dynamic convex risk measures that
will be used in several examples later on: Dynamic entropic risk measures.
Therefore, we first have to introduce:
Definition 4.3.9 (Relative Conditional Entropy). For P Q, we define the
relative entropy of P with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Ht(P|Q) := EP [logZt] ,
where (Zt)t by virtue of Zt :=
dP
dQ |Ft denotes the density process of P with
respect to Q. Furthermore, we define the conditional relative entropy of P
with respect to Q at time t ≥ 0 as
Hˆt(P|Q) := EP
[
log
ZT
Zt
∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ [ZTZt log ZTZt
∣∣∣∣Ft] I{Zt>0}.
Definition 4.3.10 (Entropic Risk Measures). Given reference model Q ∈
Me(P0). Let δ > 0. We say that dynamic convex risk ρet (X) of a random
variable X ∈ L∞, is obtained by a dynamic entropic risk measure given
reference model Q ∈Me(Pθ0) if it is of the form
ρet (X) = ess sup
P∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EP[−X|Ft]− δHˆt(P|Q)
)
. (4.1)
Equivalently, dynamic multiplier preferences (uet )t are defined by virtue of
uet (X) = ess infP∈Me(Pθ0 )
(
EP[X|Ft] + δHˆt(P|Q)
)
. (4.2)
Remark 4.3.11. The variational formula for relative entropy implies
ρet (X) = δ log(EQ[e−
1
δ
X |Ft]).
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Intuitively, an entropic risk measure means that the agent in an uncer-
tain setting believes the reference model Q as most likely and distributions
“further away” as more unlikely. Again, we can write (ρet )t by virtue of
ρet (X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
(
EPθ [−X|Ft]− δHˆt(θ|η)
)
,
where Pη defines the reference model.
4.4 A Constructive Approach to Learning
In this section, we try to explicitly develop a learning mechanism by virtue of
penalty functions that are then used for the robust representation of dynamic
convex risk measures. We will encounter, that this is not an eligible approach
to model learning as it is still not clear how to explicitly form a penalty. In
a later section, we will just take the robust representation as given and pose
the question what can be said about learning when distinct properties of the
penalty are assumed.
4.4.1 The Intuition of Learning via Penalties
In a first, intuitive approach, we explicitly introduce a learning mechanism
to the penalty (αt)t in terms of a likelihood function. The fundamental idea
is that the penalty might be viewed as a measure for the likelihood of a
distribution. In the extreme case of coherent risk, this means
• αt(θ) =∞: Pθ is not possible,
• αt(θ) = 0: Pθ is among the most likely.
In general, the larger αt, the less likely the respective distribution. Stated in
other terms, (αt)t is a measure for uncertainty aversion: given two penalties
(α1t )t and (α
2
t )t, the a.s. larger one corresponds to the less uncertainty averse
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agent. In the entropic case, αt(θ) = Ht(Pθ|Pθ¯), the conditional relative en-
tropy of Pθ with respect to Pθ¯ at time t, the agent considers Pθ¯ most likely as
Ht(Pθ¯|Pθ¯) = 0 and distributions “further away” as more and more unlikely.
In the coherent case characterized by a trivial penalty, learning means to
alternate the sets Q˜t := {P ∈ Q˜ | P(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft)} , t = 0, ..., T of condi-
tional priors on which the penalty has value zero: when more information is
available and hence, more might be known about the distribution that rules
the world, Q˜t ⊃ ˜Qt+1, i.e. penalty is increasing in t. For some cut off value
β, an intuitive approach would be in terms of some likelihood function l:
αt(θ) =
{
0 if l(Pθ|θ,Ft) ≥ β,
∞ else.
As a direct generalization to convex risk measures, one might consider the
log-likelihood − log(l(Q|θ,Ft)) as penalty. It will turn out that this approach
is not eligible since a penalty defined in terms of likelihood functions is not
feasible. Hence, we come up with a distinct ansatz in which penalty is given
by relative conditional entropy. We then achieve a dynamic convex risk
measure but run into trouble regarding time-consistency. A model defined
as above serves as a measure theoretic fundament of H.P. Minsky’s theory
of financial instability: A sequence of “good” events causes the penalty to
be smaller for distributions that stochastically dominate for the payoff under
consideration. Upon observing favorable events, the agent thinks that nature
has become kinder. This might help to understand underestimation of risk
leading to bubbles and financial instability in times of growth and financial
success.
4.4.2 Special Case: Explicit Learning for Coherent Risk
[Epstein & Schneider, 07] introduce learning for coherent risk in terms of
likelihood ratio tests. As we will see later, they do not consider the sets of
priors (Qt)t as for example in [Riedel, 04] but the process Pt(Ft) of one-step
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ahead conditional beliefs, formally introduced below, as these immediately
represent the learning process. Moreover, [Epstein & Schneider, 07] distin-
guish between information that can be learned and information that cannot:
Information that can be learned is incorporated in a the set of priors not
being singleton, information that cannot be learned is incorporated in the
set of likelihood functions not being singleton.
Formally, let the state space be given by ST := ⊗Tt=1St, St = S, Θ as in the
general model. The space of parameters will be slightly modified, i.e. every
θ ∈ Θ uniquely characterizes a distribution on S and not on Ω; however,
this modification is restricted to the current subsection. Let Q0 ⊂M(Θ) be
the set of priors on Θ and L the set of likelihoods, i.e. every l ∈ L satisfies
l(·|θ) ∈ M(S) and l(st|·) is Ft-measurable for st ∈ St. Set st = (s1, . . . , st),
si ∈ Si. Every µ0 ∈ Q0 together with a family of likelihoods (l1, l2, . . .) ∈ L∞
induces a prior P ∈Me(P0) of the payoff process or, equivalently, the process
(pt)t of one-step-ahead conditionals
pt(·|st) =
∫
Θ
l(·|θ)dµt(θ|st) ∈M(St+1),
where µt is derived from µ0 as described below and µt(·|st) ∈ Qt(st), the set
of posterior beliefs on Θ given history st. Hence, multiplicity of beliefs is
described by
Pt(st) =
{
pt(·|st) =
∫
Θ
l(·|θ)dµt(θ)
∣∣∣∣ µt ∈ Qαt (st), l ∈ L}
:=
∫
Θ
L(·|θ)dQαt (θ).
To complete the model, it leaves to show how (µ0; l1, . . .) induce µt or, equiv-
alently, how Qt(st) is obtained. For (µ0; l1, . . .), the posteriors are obtained
by Bayesian updating:
dµt(·, st, µ0, lt)
=
lt(st|·)∫
Θ
lt(st|θ˜)dµt−1(θ˜, st−1, µ0, lt−1)
dµt−1(·, st−1, µ0, lt−1).
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Then, the posteriors are achieved by virtue of a likelihood ratio test in terms
of the unconditional data density:
Qαt (st) :=
{
µt(s
t, µ0, l
t)
∣∣∣∣∣µ0 ∈ Q0, lt ∈ Lt,
∫ t∏
j=1
lj(sj|θ)dµ0(θ)
≥ β max
µ¯0∈Q0,l¯t∈Lt
∫ t∏
j=1
l¯j(sj|θ)dµ¯0(θ)
}
for some bound β ∈ R+.
Remark 4.4.1. Conceptually, there is a huge difference between the ap-
proach in [Epstein & Schneider, 07] and [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89]: In the
latter, the term “multiple priors” means multiple distributions of the payoff
stream, all being equally likely, in the former, it means multiple distribu-
tions of the parameter, i.e. multiple distributions on the distributions of
the payoff stream. Hence, [Epstein & Schneider, 07] is a generalization of
[Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] as the latter framework is achieved with Q0 = {µ0}
with µ0 the uniform distribution on some subset of Θ. In that case we have
a trivial α and hence a coherent risk measure. Intuitively, a uniform distri-
bution on a subset of Θ corresponds to the agent believing all distributions in
that subset being equally likely and the others impossible.
Nevertheless, fruitful insights from [Epstein & Schneider, 07] can be gained
for our approach in particular the incorporation of a likelihood ratio test. We
go a step closer to [Gilboa & Schmeidler, 89] and introduce a single distribu-
tion on Θ inducing a unique penalty for a dynamic convex risk measure.
4.4.3 A First, Particularly Intuitive Approach: Sim-
plistic Learning
As stated above, multiple prior preferences mean the agent has a uniform
distribution on a subset of Θ: She is sure about which parameters are possible
and which not, but has no tendency towards their likeliness. In a way, this
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corresponds to a non-informative weighting or a trivial penalty function α0.
We act on this non-informative approach and assume the following penalty
at time zero: Let Θ˜ ⊂ Θ. The penalty corresponding to this distribution is
given by:
αt(θ) =
{
0 if θ ∈ Θ˜,
∞ else.
Hence, initially the convex risk measure is actually coherent:
ρ0(X) := ess sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X]− α0(θ)
}
= ess sup
θ∈Θ˜
EPθ [−X].
We now come up with a simple learning mechanism directly defining the
dynamic penalty function (αt)t in terms of likelihoods. At t = 0, we have
already characterized the penalty. Furthermore, we set
α1(θ) := − ln
(
l(s1|θ)
supθ¯ l(s1|θ¯)
)
= − ln
(
Qθ(s1)
supθ¯Qθ¯(s1)
)
,
where s1 = s
1 and
α2(θ) = − ln
(
l(s2|θ)
supθ¯ l(s
2|θ¯)
)
= − ln
(
Qθ(s1)Qθ(s2|θ, s1)
γ2
)
,
where γ2 := supθ∈ΘQθ(s1)Qθ(s2|θ, s1).
Definition 4.4.2. We say that the penalty (αt)t in the robust representation
of the convex dynamic risk measure (ρt)t is achieved by simplistic learning,
if it is of the form:
αt(θ) := − ln
(∏t
i=1Qθ(si|θ, si−1)
γt
)
,
where γt := supθ∈Θ
∏t
i=1Qθ(si|θ, si−1).
Remark 4.4.3 (On improperness of simplistic learning). (αt)t achieved by
simplistic leaning is not a feasible penalty function.
Proof. A penalty at t should include the conditional distributions from t
onwards as seen in the definition. In our likelihood approach αt only depends
on distributions up to time t, i.e. already realized entities of the density
process.
68
4.4. A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO LEARNING
4.4.4 A Second, More Sophisticated Approach: En-
tropic Learning
We now incorporate the likelihood function in the relative entropy in order
to achieve a risk measure based on the well known and elegant entropic risk
measures.
Here, we assume θ = (θt)t ∈ Θ; every entity θt characterizes a distribution
in M(St) possibly dependent on (θi)i<t. The family θ = (θt)t then defines a
prior Pθ ∈Me(Pθ0). Set θt := (θ1, . . . , θt) analogous to st.
In the foregoing section, we have seen the major problem to be that our
“penalty” was only contingent on the past evolution of the density process.
There is however a whole bunch of possibilities to estimate the future by use
of past information. A prominent route is by virtue of maximum likelihood
estimator.
Definition 4.4.4 (Experience Based Learning). (a) Given likelihood l. Being
at time t, learning is said to be naive if the estimator θˆt for θt is achieved
solely by taking into account maximum likelihood for the observation st at
time t.
(b) Learning is called intermediate or experience based at level m, if θˆt is
the maximum likelihood estimator of the last m observations (st−m, . . . , st)
MLE−m ∈ arg max
θt∈Θ
l(st−m, . . . , st|θt, θˆt−1, st−m−1).
(c) Learning is said to be of maximum likelihood type, if, at any t, θˆt is the
maximum likelihood estimator of the whole history.
Note that the naive estimator is just the intermediate one at level zero.
Furthermore, note that our definition of experience based maximum like-
lihood. In the next definition, we characterize how learning results in a
distribution for the payoff.
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Definition 4.4.5 (Learning Distributions). Being at time t, having obtained
θˆt and the foregoing estimators (θˆi)i<t, the reference family θˆ of parameters
is achieved by
θˆi =
{
θˆi i ≤ t,
θˆt i > t.
Having seen how agents learn about the best fitting distribution, we now
formally introduce entropic learning for which dynamic entropic risk mea-
sures in Definition 4.3.10 serve as a vehicle: We choose the best fitting dis-
tribution as reference distribution in the conditional relative entropy.
The agent’s variational utility incorporating learning is in our setup given
by a convex risk measure with an entropic penalty function:
Definition 4.4.6 (Experience Based Entropic Risk). A penalty (αˆt)t is said
to be achieved by experience based entropic learning if given as
αˆt(η) := δHˆt(Pη|Pθˆ)
for δ > 0 and θˆ = (θˆt)t achieved as in Definition 4.4.5, η = (ηt)t ∈ Θ. The
resulting convex risk measure (ρˆt)t incorporating this very penalty function is
then called experience based entropic risk.
Remark 4.4.7. (αˆθt )t is well defined as penalty; this is inter alia shown in
[Fo¨llmer & Schied, 04]. Due to our construction, the penalty now incorpo-
rates conditional distributions of future movements.
Remark 4.4.8. When the parameter is also the realization of an entity in
the density process, e.g. in a tree (cp. the example below), relative entropy
can directly be written as
αˆt(θ) = EP
θ
[
ln
(
dPθ
dPθ0
/ dPθˆ
dPθ0
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
.
Remark 4.4.9. Naive entropic learning reflects the tendency of the agent to
forget (or ignore) about the distant past and just assume the present to be the
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best estimator of the underlying model. This learning mechanism is then of
course particularly adjuvant in explaining a bubble as it is harder to see that
the financial system moves away from the fundamentals.
Despite [Epstein & Schneider, 07] we do not consider multiplicity of likeli-
hoods here. Hence, we do not incorporate information that cannot be learned
upon in our model. Though real world applications with several true param-
eters, e.g. in incomplete financial markets with a multiplicity of equivalent
martingale measures, would be modeled in terms of multiple likelihoods.
However, our main result in this section on “time-inconsistency” of expe-
rience based entropic risk would not change when extending the model to
multiple likelihoods.
Proposition 4.4.10. The model is well defined, i.e. for every t, ρˆt is a
conditional convex risk measure.
Proof. As can easily be seen, the model satisfies the axioms of convex risk
measures: ρˆt : L
∞ → L∞t and
• ρˆt is monotone, i.e. ρˆt(X) ≤ ρˆt(Y ) for X ≥ Y a.s.
• ρˆt is cash-invariant, i.e. ρˆt(X +m) = ρˆt(X)−m ∀m ∈ Lt, X ∈ LT
• ρˆt is convex as a function on LT
As inter alia shown [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], Proposition 4.4, dynamic en-
tropic risk measures are time-consistent when the reference distribution is
not learned but fixed at the beginning. However, now that the reference
distribution is also stochastic, we achieve:
Proposition 4.4.11. Experience based entropic risk is in general not time-
consistent.
Proof. As proof we construct the following counterexample showing an ex-
perience based entropic risk measure which is not time-consistent.
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Example 4.4.12 (Entropic Risk in a Tree). Since our example is mainly for
demonstration purposes we restrict ourselves to a simple Cox-Ross-Rubinstein
model with 3 time periods. Each time period is independent of those before.
One could imagine that in every time period a different coin is thrown and
the result of the coin toss determines the realization in the tree, e.g. from
heads results up and from tails down. The payoffs of our random variable
X are limited to the last time-period and are as shown in the figure below.
For tractability reasons we also confine ourselves to a single likelihood func-
tion l(· | θ). For the same reason we will also use the extreme case of naive
updating which means our reference distribution will merely depend on the
last observed event in our tree. The probability for going up in this tree will
always be assumed to lie in the interval [a, b] where 0 < a ≤ b < 1.
1
-1
-3
-2
0
2
1
-1
0
p ∈ [a, b]
3
Figure 4.1: Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Model
Time-period 2: Since we want to show a contradiction to time-consistency
we will show that the recursive formula
ρˆt(X) = ρˆt(−ρˆt+s(X)) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and s ∈ N
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is violated. So we start with the calculation of ρ2(X) for the different sets in
F2
ρˆ2(X)(up, up)
= ess sup
p∈[a,b]
E [−X | F2] (up, up)− E
[
ln
(
θ2
θ∗2
)
| F2
]
(up, up)
= sup
p∈[a,b]
(
−3p− 1 + p− p ln p
b
− (1− p) ln
(
1− p
1− b
))
= ln
(
be−3 + (1− b)e−1) ,
where the reference distribution Pθ∗ induced by θ∗ is determined by the fol-
lowing maximization:
θ∗ = (θ∗0, θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2), θ
∗
2 ∈ arg max
θ2∈[a,b]
l(up | θ2)
giving us the maximum-likelihood estimator for what happened in the last
time-period which we also think is the right distribution for the next time-
period.
The result of this computation can also be obtained by using a variational
form which can for example be found in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] and takes
the following form
ρˆt(X) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | Ft] ,
where Pθ∗ is again the reference distribution the decision maker establishes
by looking at the past, which, as we look at naive learning, will again only
be what happened in the last period. Since this gives way for an easier and
quicker computation we will use this form for the following calculations:
ρˆ2(X)(down, up) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (down, up)
= ln
(
be−1 + (1− b)e1) ,
ρˆ2(X)(up, down) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (up, down)
= ln
(
ae−1 + (1− a)e1) .
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Here one can nicely observe the extremeness of the naive learning approach.
Even though the decision maker in these two calculations is located at the
same vertex in the tree he has very different beliefs about the probability of
going up or down which causes strong shifts in his risk conception.
In the case of going first down then up he clearly believes up will be more
probable in the next step. This is visible in his choice of reference measure
Pθ∗ in the penalty function which he sets b for going up and 1 − b for going
down.
In contrast to this the decision maker who has observed up and then down
will put more weight on the probability of going down in the next step and
therefore sets his reference measure a for up and 1− a for down.
For the last possible event in time 2 our risk-measure takes the following
value:
ρˆ2(X)(down, down) = lnEP
θ∗
[exp(−X) | F2] (down, down)
= ln
(
ae1 + (1− a)e3) .
Time-period 1: If for the next time-period we maintain the assumption of
time-consistency and make use of the recursive formula, using the variational
form as we did above will yield
ρˆ1(X)(up) = ρˆ1(−ρˆ2(X))(up) = lnEPθ
∗
[exp(ρˆ2(X)) | F1](up)
= ln
(
b
(
be−3 + (1− b)e−1)+ (1− b) (ae−1 + (1− a)e1))
= ln
(
b2e−3 + (a+ b)(1− b)e−1 + (1− a)e1) .
Now if we calculate ρˆ1(X)(up) without the time-consistency assumption mean-
ing we cannot use the recursive formula we obtain the following equation:
ρˆ1(X)(up) = ess sup
p,q∈[a,b]
Ep,q [−X | F1] (up)− Ep,q
[
ln
(
θ1θ2
θ∗1θ
∗
2
)
| F1
]
(up)
= ln
(
b2e−3 + 2b(1− b)e−1 + (1− b)2e1) .
This clearly is not the same as we obtained under the assumption of time-
consistency. However if our dynamic experience based entropic risk measure
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were time-consistent these calculations should give us the same results. Hence
this example clearly shows us that the assumption of our risk measure being
time-consistent only leads up to contradictions and can therefore not be true.
To emphasize the reason for these inconsistencies set Zt :=
dPθ1
dPθ2
∣∣∣
Ft
, where
Pθi is the reference distribution the agent obtains at time i when looking at
past realizations and then maximizing the respective likelihood function. Then
for instance for t = 1 and ω = up we obtain:
ρˆ1(−ρˆ2(X − ln ZT
Z2
))(up)
= ln
[
EPθ1
[
exp
(
ρ2
(
X3 − ln Z3
Z2
))]
| F1
]
(up)
= ln
[
bEPθ2
[
e−X
Z
Z2
| F2
]
(up, up)
+(1− b)EPθ2
[
e−X
Z
Z2
| F2
]
(up, down)
]
= ln
[
b
(
be−3
bbb
bbb
bb
bb
+ (1− b)e−1 bb(1− b)
bb(1− b)
bb
bb
)
+ (1− b)
(
ae−1
b(1− b)b
b(1− b)a
b(1− b)
b(1− b)
+(1− a)e1 b(1− b)(1− b)
b(1− b)(1− a)
b(1− b)
b(1− b)
)]
= ln
[
b2e−3 + 2b(1− b)e−1 + (1− b)2e1] = ρ1(X)(up),
which, if ZT
Zi
6= 1 (generally true), clearly contradicts time-consistency.
In this special case for example the measure Pθ1 corresponds to the mea-
sure assigning the probability b to up in every time period, whereas Pθ2 is the
measure assigning b to up in the first 2 time periods and a in the last. That
is why e.g. Z3(up, down, up) =
b(1−b)b
b(1−b)a and
Z3
Z2
(up, down, up) = b
a
.
4.4.5 Lack of Time Consistency
As we have seen in the foregoing paragraph our definition of experience based
entropic risk does not result in a time-consistent dynamic convex risk mea-
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sure. This insight is somewhat disappointing as time consistency is a pros-
perous vehicle to solve tangible problems. On the other hand, [Schied, 07]
shows that a meaningful theory of convex risk can even be achieved in a not
generally time-consistent setting.
We have to pose the following question: Does there exist any learning
model for the reference distribution such that dynamic entropic risk becomes
time-consistent?
Remark 4.4.13. The major issue that might come into mind is the inde-
pendence of the reference distribution of future histories. As we will see,
this is basically the reason for the general impossibility result below. Fur-
thermore, the worst-case distribution chosen by nature is heavily dependent
on the reference distribution. As the latter one may change in a broad va-
riety of manners, there is no good reason to expect nature to choose in a
time-consistent way.
Next, we pose the most general definition of learning in entropic set-ups.
Definition 4.4.14. A reference distribution Pθ˜ for experience based entropic
risk is said to be obtained by general learning if the family (θ˜t)t is a family
of random variables, i.e. not deterministically fixed from scratch. We call
the resulting dynamic convex risk measure (ρ˜gt )t defined by virtue of α˜
g
t :=
Hˆt(·|(θ˜t)t) in the robust representation general experience based entropic risk.
We see that our definition of experience based entropic risk satisfies the
above definition as in that context learning takes place in terms of maximum
likelihood.
Using this general definition of learning, we can show an impossibility
result for time-consistency of general experience based entropic risk.
Proposition 4.4.15. General experience based entropic risk (ρ˜gt )t is in gen-
eral not time-consistent.
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Proof. Let θ˜ = (θ˜1, . . .) be obtained by general learning and
tθ˜ such that
Ptθ˜ = Pθ˜(·|Ft). Let Zt+1 := dQ
tθ˜
dQt+1θ˜
∣∣∣
Ft+1
. Then, we have
ρ˜gt (X) = lnEQ
tθ˜ [
e−X
∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
elnE
Q
tθ˜
[e−X|Ft+1]
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
e
lnEQ
t+1θ˜
[
ZT
Zt+1
e−X
∣∣∣Ft+1]∣∣∣∣Ft]
= lnEQ
tθ˜
[
e
−(−ρt+1(X−ln( ZTZt+1 )))
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= ρ˜gt (−ρ˜gt+1(X − ln(
ZT
Zt+1
)))
6= ρ˜gt (−ρ˜gt+1(X)),
if ZT
Zt+1
6= 1 a.s., i.e. if, intuitively speaking, learning actually takes place and,
hence, the reference distributions at distinct time periods differ.
The foregoing result immediately implies our main intuition for expe-
rience based entropic risk not being time-consistent though quite puzzling
as entropic risk measures are broadly used as standard example for time-
consistent convex risk.
Remark 4.4.16 (Main Intuition). The minimal penalty function uniquely
defines a risk measure. Changing the reference distribution due to learning
results in a different minimal penalty and hence, a distinct risk measure.
Hence, an experience based entropic risk measure is actually a family of dy-
namic entropic risk measures and our definition of time-consistency is not
even applicable.
4.4.6 A Retrospective – In Between
In this section, we have stated a constructive approach to learning for convex
risk measures. We have encountered several problems in doing that:
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• In our first intuitive approach, we ran into problems in defining a
penalty function not entirely contingent on the past evolution of the
density process.
• In our second one, we ran into time-consistency problems.
In a way, in the next section, we put the cart before the horse: We
just take the robust representation in terms of minimal penalty of time-
consistent dynamic convex risk measures as given and ask ourselves what can
be said about “learning” in that respect. We will show an equivalent to the
fundamental Blackwell-Dubins Theorem for convex risk measures. As will be
seen, this result will be equivalently satisfied whenever the true parameter
is eventually learned upon as defined in the subsequent subsection. Our
result states some kind of herding behavior as every market participant will
eventually perceive risk in the same manner.
4.4.7 Learning for a given Time-Consistent Convex Risk
Measure
We now want to encounter, whether we actually have to construct a learning
mechanism or if learning is not already incorporated in some sense in the
concept of a time-consistent convex risk measure.
Remark 4.4.17. We have stated that the time-consistency problem encoun-
tered so far in learning models is due to the fact that penalties are not just
random variables but random itself, i.e. also the functional form depends on
the observations. This assumption in general contradicts time-consistency as
we actually may achieve distinct risk measures at a particular point in time.
However, the basis for learning is already incorporated in convex risk as the
domain of penalty consists of Bayesian updated distributions of the process.
Let us hence assume a true underlying parameter θ0 ∈ Θ and the agent
evaluates risk in terms of robust representation of time-consistent dynamic
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convex risk (ρt)t with minimal penalty (α
min
t )t. We then state the following
definition:
Definition 4.4.18. We say that θ0 is eventually learned upon if∣∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]∣∣∣→ 0 Pθ0 − a.e.
for t→∞.
Proposition 4.4.19. The above definition is satisfied if and only if
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣ρt(X)− ∫
St+1
−ρt+1(X)Pθ0(dst+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣ = 0 Pθ0 − a.e.
Proof. cp. [Klibanoff et al., 08], Proposition 5.
In the time-consistent case, the following assertion is equivalent to Defi-
nition 4.4.18:
Proposition 4.4.20. Given a time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure
(ρt)t, then θ0 is eventually learned upon if and only if
αmint (θ)
t→∞−→ 0 Pθ0 − a.e
for all θ such that αmin0 (θ) <∞.
Proof. As (ρt)t is assumed to be time-consistent, it holds for all t
ρt = ρt(−ρt+1)
or, more elaborately, for all X
ρt(X)
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
.
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As further for all X ∫
St+1
−ρt+1(X)Pθ0(dst+1|Ft)
= EPθ0 [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]
= sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−ρt+1(X)| Ft]− α¯mint (θ)
}
,
where (α¯mint )t is defined as
α¯mint (θ) :=
{
0 if θ = θ0
∞ else,
the proof follows readily: αmint (θ)
t→∞−→ α¯mint (θ) by Proposition 4.4.19. Theo-
rem 5.4.(4) in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] then shows equivalence to a vanishing
limit given time-consistency.
In the subsequent sections, we show the notion of being eventually learned
upon to be satisfied by convex risk measures in case of time-consistency and
under less stringent assumptions in terms of Blackwell & Dubins.
4.5 Adaption of Blackwell-Dubins Theorem
As a cornerstone for our main result on convergence of dynamic convex
risk measures, we first generalize the famous Blackwell-Dubins theorem, cp.
[Blackwell & Dubins, 62], from conditional probabilities to conditional expec-
tations of risky projects. As set out in the model section, we assume existence
of a reference distribution Pθ0 , θ0 ∈ Θ, as in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62]. This
reference has to be interpersonally being agreed upon.
Proposition 4.5.1. Let Pθ be absolutely continuous with respect to Pθ0 for
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some θ ∈ Θ,1 X as in the definition of the model, then∣∣EPθ [X |Ft]− EPθ0 [X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
Proof. For improving readability denote Pθ0 by P and Pθ by Q.
Given P and Q, Q being assumed absolutely continuous with respect to
P, i.e. dQ
dP = q, and for every n,
dQ(·|Ft)
dP(·|Ft) = q(·|Ft). Then, the following line of
equations holds:
EQ[X|Ft] = EQ(·|Ft)[X]
= EP(·|Ft)[q(·|Ft)X]
and hence∣∣EQ[X|Ft]− EP[X|Ft]∣∣ = ∣∣EP(·|Ft) [(q(·|Ft)− 1)X]∣∣
≤ κ ∣∣EP(·|Ft) [(q(·|Ft)− 1)]∣∣
= κ
∣∣∣∣∫ (q(·|Ft)− 1)P(d · |Ft)∣∣∣∣ ,
which converges to zero P-a.s. by Blackwell-Dubins theorem as (Ft)t is as-
sumed to be a filtration and, hence, an increasing family of σ-fields.
Remark 4.5.2. As we see in the proof, the parametric setting is not needed.
The assertion can be shown in the same fashion in a non-parametric setting.
The same holds true for subsequent results.
4.6 Time-Consistent Risk Measures
We will now show a Blackwell-Dubins type result for coherent as well as
convex risk measures in case time-consistency is assumed. We see that the
risk measure eventually equals the expected value under the true parameter;
in this sense, uncertainty vanishes but risk remains.
1Note that we have assumed all distributions induced by parameters θ ∈ Θ to be
equivalent. In particular, all those are absolutely continuous with respect to each other
and this assumption is no restriction within our setup. Also note that the respective θ
does not have to be θ0.
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4.6.1 Time-Consistent Coherent Risk
Let (ρt)t be a time-consistent coherent risk measure possessing robust repre-
sentation
ρt(X) = sup
θ∈Θ˜
EPθ [−X |Ft],
with Θ˜ ⊂ Θ assumed to be a convex and compact set of parameters inducing
a weakly compact and convex set of priors Q˜ ⊂ Me(Pθ0).
Proposition 4.6.1. For every essentially bounded F-measurable random
variable X and time-consistent coherent risk measure (ρt)t we have∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
Proof. Thanks to the assumption of time-consistency and compactness there
exists a parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ˜ such that ρt(X) = EPθ
∗
[−X |Ft] for all t ∈
{0, ..., T} resulting in the following equation
∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣ = ∣∣EPθ∗ [−X |Ft]− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣
and this converges to zero as t increases and Pθ∗ ∼ Pθ0 by Proposition 4.5.1.
Remark 4.6.2. Note that we have not assumed θ0 ∈ Θ˜.
Remark 4.6.3. The assumption that Θ˜ is weakly compact is a very crucial
assumption, as it assures that the supremum is actually attained. Addition-
ally it is a necessary property for our result to hold, which is shown in the
Proposition 4.6.4.
Proposition 4.6.4. Weak compactness of the set {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ˜} of priors is a
necessary condition for our result in Proposition 4.6.1 to hold.
Proof. For the proof, see the counterexample in Section 4.8.2.
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4.6.2 Time-Consistent Convex Risk
Let (ρt)t be a time-consistent dynamic convex risk measure, hence, possessing
the following robust representation:
ρt(X) = ess sup
θ∈Θ
{
EPθ [−X|Ft]− αmint (θ)
}
with dynamic minimal penalty (αmint )t.
Assumption 4.6.5. We assume (ρt)t to be continuous from below for all t,
i.e. for every sequence of random variables (Xj)j, Xj ∈ L∞ for all j, with
Xj ↗ X ∈ L∞ we have limj→∞ ρt(Xj) = ρt(X).
Remark 4.6.6. In the coherent case, continuity from below is equivalent to
weak compactness of the set {Pθ|(αt(θ))t = 0} = {Pθ|θ ∈ Θ˜} of priors as
inter alia shown in [Riedel, 09].
This assumption has technical advantages as it ensures the supremum to
be achieved in the robust representation of ρt. A proof is given in Theorem
1.2 of [Fo¨llmer et al., 07]. It is also shown that continuity from below implies
continuity from above. To sum up: continuity from above is equivalent to the
existence of a robust representation. Continuity from below (which general-
izes the compactness assumption in the coherent case) is equivalent to the
existence of a robust representation in terms of a distinct prior distribution,
the so called worst case distribution.
From an economic point of view, continuity from below results from a
feature of preferences already claimed in [Arrow, 71] and related to this as-
sumption by [Chateauneuf et al., 05]. The condition on preferences we need
to ask for in order to obtain this feature is called Monotone Continuity: If
an act f is preferred over an act g then a consequence x is never that bad
that there is no small p such that x with probability p and f with probability
(1−p) is still preferred over g. The same is true for good consequences mixed
with g.
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Formally this means, for acts f  g, a consequence x and a sequence of
events {En}n∈N with E1 ⊇ E2 ⊇ ... and ∩n∈NEn = ∅ there exists an n¯ ∈ N
such that [
x if s ∈ En¯
f(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
 g and f 
[
x if s ∈ En¯
g(s) if s /∈ En¯
]
.
Now with the help of this assumption we can show the Blackwell-Dubins
result for time-consistent convex risk measures:
Proposition 4.6.7. For every essentially bounded F-measurable random
variable X and time-consistent convex risk measure (ρt)t, continuous from
below, it holds∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞
if there exists θ ∈ Θ such that αmint (θ) → 0 Pθ0-almost surely and αmin0 (θ) <
∞.
Remark 4.6.8 (On the Assumption). By the main assumption in Proposi-
tion 4.6.7 there ought to be some θ such that the penalty vanishes in the long
run. This intuitively means that, eventually, nature at least has to pretend
some distribution to be the correct one. We see that this is satisfied e.g. in
the coherent or in the entropic case.
The assertion then states that it does not matter which risk measure was
chosen as long as the penalty is finite in the beginning. In the time-consistent
case, the penalty then vanishes for all those parameters and the convex risk
eventually will be coherent.
As we will see later, in the non-time-consistent case, nature has to pay a
price for not choosing a distribution time-consistently as in that case penalty
has to vanish for the true underlying parameter. To conclude: when nature
chooses the worst case distribution time-consistently, she merely has to pre-
tend some distribution to be the underlying one. If she does not choose the
worst case measures at any stage time-consistently, she has to reveal the true
underlying distribution in the long run.
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Remark 4.6.9. By Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] due to time-
consistency the assumption αmint (θ)→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for some θ ∈ Θ is
equivalent to αmint (θ)→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for all θ ∈ Θ with α0(θ) <∞.
Proof of the proposition. By our assumptions on (ρt)t there exists θ
∗ ∈ Θ
such that the assertion becomes∣∣∣EPθ∗ [−X|Ft]− αmint (θ∗)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]∣∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
By the foregoing proposition on coherent risk, we know that this assertion
holds if and only if ∣∣αmint (θ∗)∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] implies this convergence being equiv-
alent to ∣∣αmint (θ)∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-a.s.
for some θ ∈ Θ such that α0(θ) <∞ as assumed to hold in the assertion.
Corollary 4.6.10. By Proposition 4.4.20 under the conditions of Proposition
4.6.7, θ0 is eventually learned upon.
Again, note that we have not assumed θ0 such that α0(θ0) <∞.
Corollary 4.6.11. Every dynamic time-consistent convex risk measure (ρt)t
satisfying the assumptions of the Proposition 4.6.7 is asymptotically precise
as in the sense of [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06], i.e. ρt(X)→ ρ∞(X) = −X, and
vice versa. In particular, this holds for the coherent case as t→∞.
Proof. By the assumption of continuity from below, we know that a worst
case measure in the robust representation of (ρt)t is actually achieved. By
Theorem 5.4 (5) in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] we have that ρt(X)→ ρ∞(X) ≥
−X as we have assumed αmint (θ0) → 0. Then the assertion is shown by
Proposition 5.11 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
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Remark 4.6.12. In [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] time-consistency is directly used
to show the existence of the limit ρ∞ := limt→∞ρt. As, by assumptions on X
in the model, limt→∞(EP
θ0 [−X |Ft]) exists we achieve existence of ρ∞ from
our result not directly from time-consistency. In our proposition the con-
vergence of the α corresponds to asymptotic precision, however starting at a
different point of view. The question now is if time-consistency is a necessary
condition for our result to hold. If so, we have gained nothing, if not, we have
a more general existence result for ρ∞ than [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. We will
tackle the problem of necessity of time-consistency for our result within the
next section.
Proposition 4.6.13. (ρt)t being continuous from below is a necessary con-
dition for the result in Theorem 4.6.7 to hold.
Proof. In Proposition 4.6.4 we show necessity of weak compactness of the set
of priors for coherent risk measures. However, weak compactness is equivalent
to continuity from below and coherent risk measures are particular examples
for convex ones. This proofs the assertion.
Remark 4.6.14. In Proposition 4.6.7, if there does not exist θ such that
αmint (θ)→ 0 but αmint (θ∗) ≤ c ∈ R+ for all t ≥ n0 for some n0 ∈ N then there
is at least an upper bound on the remaining uncertainty:
|ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X|Ft]| ≤ c
as t→∞.
4.7 Not Necessarily Time-Consistent Risk Mea-
sures
We will now achieve a Blackwell-Dubins type result for dynamic coherent and
convex risk measures for which we do not pose the time-consistency assump-
tion. However, we still assume the dynamic risk measure to be continuous
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from below, i.e. in the coherent case the set of priors to be weakly compact.
We can still show that anticipation of risk converges to the expected value
of a risky project X as defined in the model with respect to the underlying
parameter θ0.
4.7.1 Non Time-Consistent Coherent Risk
We will now restate the result in a manner that time-consistency is not
needed. We however need to assume that learning takes place; which is a
more liberal assumption than time-consistency as seen in Section 4.8.3.
Definition 4.7.1. (a) Given a dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t, continu-
ous from below but not necessarily time-consistent, we call a distribution Pθ∗t
instantaneous worst case distribution at t if it satisfies2
ρt(X) = EP
θ∗t [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ∗t ).
(b) We say learning takes place if there exists a θ ∈ Θ, Pθ ∼ Pθ0, such that
the instantaneous worst case measures Pθ∗t → Pθ weakly for t → ∞. In the
coherent case we need θ ∈ Θ˜ as the penalty is infinite otherwise.
In this very definition, we see however, that the agent does not have to
learn the true underlying parameter θ0. In this sense, nature might mislead
her to a wrong parameter.
We can now relax the time-consistency assumption in the main result of
this article. Note that time-consistency is a special case of Definition 4.7.1
given continuity from below as in that case the sequence of instantaneous
worst case parameters is constant. Hence, we achieve the more general result:
Proposition 4.7.2. Let (ρt)t be a not necessarily time-consistent dynamic
coherent risk measure for which learning takes place. Then∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞.
2Note, that existence is locally guaranteed by continuity from below. As we however
have not assumed time-consistency, the instantaneous worst case distributions at each time
period may differ, hence global existence is not necessarily fulfilled.
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Proof. To make things clearer we will write the proof in terms of penalty
functions and not in terms of priors. We know that a coherent risk measure
has a robust representation of a convex risk measure with a penalty
αmint (θ) =
{
0 if Pθ(·|Ft) ∈ Q˜(·|Ft),
∞ else
where Q˜ is the set of priors, i.e. Q˜ = {Pθ|(αmint (θ))t = 0} uniquely defining
the coherent risk measure. As we are in the case of a coherent risk measure,
we particularly have αmint (θ
∗
t ) = 0.
First, note that in case αmint (θ) → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ˜3, our convergence
result cannot hold, as limt→∞ EP
θ0 [−X|Ft] exists and is finite by assumption.
Secondly, in the time-consistent (coherent as well as convex) case, it suf-
fices to assume αmint (θ¯) → 0 for some θ¯ ∈ Θ. This assumption in the time-
consistent case is equivalent to αmint (θ)→ 0 for all θ for which αmin0 (θ) <∞
by Theorem 5.4 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
Let us now turn to the proof itself: As Q˜ is assumed to be weakly compact
and non-empty, i.e. there exists a distribution that has penalty zero, we
achieve an instantaneous worst case distribution at each time step, i.e. at
any t, there exists θ∗t ∈ Θ s.t.
ρt(X) = EP
θ∗t [−X| Ft]− αmint (θ∗t ) = EP
θ∗t [−X|Ft].
Of course, due to “time-inconsistency”, we might have θ∗i 6= θ∗j for i 6= j.
The proof is completed by showing the following convergence4
EPθ
∗
n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ0 [−X|F∞] for n, t→∞.
3Of course, convergence is trivial in this case due to triviality of the penalty function.
4By our assumptions we know:
• EPθ∗n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ [−X|Ft] for n→∞ as θ∗n → θ by Portemonteau’s Theorem.
• EPθ∗n [−X|Ft]→ EPθ
∗
n [−X|F∞] for t→∞ by Proposition 4.5.1.
The question now is, whether the result also holds when letting n, t→∞ at once.
In the time-consistent case, where θ∗i = θ
∗
j for all i, j, this is immediate by Proposition
4.5.1.
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In order to do this we look at the following equation for n ≥ t which uses the
projectivity of the density, i.e. of the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
EPθ
∗
n [−X|Ft] = EPθ0 [−XdP
θ∗n
dPθ0
∣∣∣
Fn
|Ft].
Define the following sequence of random variables Yn := −X dPθ
∗
n
dPθ0
∣∣∣
Fn
. These
have finite expectation and thanks to our assumption that learning takes
place and the original Blackwell-Dubins result we have
Pθ0 [ lim
n→∞
Yn = −X] = Pθ0 [−XdP
θ∗∞
dPθ0
∣∣∣
F∞
= −X] = 1.
Then, by Lemma 4.7.4, the assertion follows.
Remark 4.7.3. Again, note that we have not assumed θ0 ∈ Θ˜.
In the foregoing proof, we need a general martingale convergence result
as stated in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62], Theorem 2. We know from Doob’s
famous martingale convergence result that
EPθ [X|Ft] = lim
t→∞
EPθ [X|F∞] a.s.
under suitable assumptions. The question is: If Xn ↗n X in some sense, is
it true that
EPθ [X|F∞] = lim
n,t→∞
EPθ [Xn|Ft] a.s.?
A positive answer is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7.4. Fix θ. Let (Yn)n be a sequence of F-measurable random
variables such that EPθ [supn |Yn|] < ∞. Assume Yn →n→∞ Y almost surely
for some F-measurable random variable Y . Then, it holds5
lim
n,t→∞
EPθ [Yn| Ft] = EPθ [Y | F ] .
5The convergence in the assertion of the lemma can also be shown in L1.
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Proof. We re-sample the proof in [Blackwell & Dubins, 62]: For k ∈ N, set
Gk := sup{Yn|n ≥ k}. If n ≥ k, we hence have Yn ≤ Gk and thus
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≤ EPθ [Gk| Ft] (4.3)
for all t. Together with Doob’s martingale convergence result and Lebesgue’s
theorem, we achieve
z := lim
j→∞
sup
n,t≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft]
(4.3)
≤ lim
j→∞
sup
t≥j
EPθ [Gk| Ft]
= lim
t→∞
EPθ [Gk| Ft]
Doob
= EPθ [Gk| F ]
and
z ≤ lim
k→∞
EPθ [Gk | F ] Lebesgue= EPθ [Y | F ] .
In the same token,
x := lim
j→∞
inf
t,n≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≥ EPθ [Y | F ] ,
which completes the proof since
x = lim
j→∞
inf
t,n≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] ≤ lim
j→∞
sup
n,t≥j
EPθ [Yn| Ft] = z.
Remark 4.7.5 (On Blackwell-Dubins Type Learning). Blackwell-Dubins ap-
plies for learning models but does not necessarily result in time-consistency
as this notion is now motivated as a special case of our notion of θ0 to be
eventually learned upon.
We have built a bridge between the first and the second part of this article:
in the first part we have achieved dynamic convex risk measures by virtue of
learning that did not turn out to be time-consistent. Hence, we have shown,
that our result even holds for those models, e.g. entropic learning.
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Remark 4.7.6. Note, that the above new version of the fundamental result
particularly holds for time-consistent dynamic coherent risk measures as then
such a limiting θ as in the Definition 4.7.1(b) always exists, the worst case
one. However, we particularly have an existence result for the limit ρ∞ :=
limt→∞ ρt in the non time-consistent case and thus a more general existence
result than in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06].
4.7.2 Non Time-Consistent Convex Risk
As in the case of coherent risk measures, we now state our generalization
of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem when the dynamic convex risk measure is
not assumed to be time-consistent. As in the coherent case, we assume that
learning takes place, i.e. there exists θ ∈ Θ such that the instantaneous worst
case θ∗t → θ as t → ∞. Furthermore, we have to assume αmint (θ∗t ) → 0 as
n→∞:6 As in the foregoing proof, we achieve convergence of the conditional
expectations under the family of instantaneous worst case distributions to the
conditional expectation under θ0.
Proposition 4.7.7. For every risky project X as set out in the model and
dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t, continuous from below but not necessarily
time-consistent, we have
∣∣ρt(X)− EPθ0 [−X |Ft]∣∣→ 0 Pθ0-almost surely for t→∞
if learning takes place for an instantaneous worst case sequence (θ∗t )t toward
some θ ∈ Θ and we have
αmint (θ
∗
t )→ 0.
Proof. Applying the procedure used in the proof of Proposition 4.7.2 to the
proof of Proposition 4.6.7 shows the assertion.
6Note, again, we do not have to assume αmint (θ0)→ 0.
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4.8 Examples
In this section, we first consider dynamic entropic risk measures as a promi-
nent economic example of time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures. In
the second part we state a counterexample serving as proof for Proposition
4.6.4 and 4.6.13. As a last point, we consider a dynamic risk measure that is
not time-consistent.
4.8.1 Entropic Risk
Here, we will have a look at time-consistent dynamic entropic risk measure
(ρet )t. Recall its Definition 4.3.10 in terms of
ρet(X) := δ logE
[
e−γX
∣∣Ft]
for some model parameter δ > 0. A fundamental result shows that the
robust representation of dynamic entropic risk is given in terms of conditional
relative entropy as penalty function, i.e. for all n, we have
αmint (θ) =
1
γ
Hˆt(Pθ|Pη) := 1
γ
EPθ
[
ln
ZT
Zt
∣∣∣∣Ft] ,
where Zt :=
dPθ
dPη
∣∣∣
Ft
, the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Pθ with respect to Pη
conditional on Ft.
The fundamental Blackwell-Dubins Theorem immediately shows that
∣∣Pθ(·|Ft)− Pη(·|Ft)∣∣→ 0
for every θ, η. Hence, we have that ZT
Zt
→ 1 Pθ0-a.s. for t→∞ and hence
αmint (θ)→ 0
showing Proposition 4.6.7 to hold. This is an alternative way to show the
last assertion in Theorem 6.3 in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06] directly.
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4.8.2 Counterexample
To show necessity of continuity from below in Proposition 4.6.7 we consider
the following example introduced in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]:
The underlying probability space consists of the state space Ω = (0, 1]
endowed with the Lebesgue measure Pθ0 and a filtration (Ft)t generated by
the dyadic partitions of Ω. This means Ft is generated by the sets Jt,k :=
(k2−t, (k + 1)2−t] for k = 0, ..., 2t−1. In this setting [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
construct a time-consistent coherent and therefore convex risk measures with
αmint (θ0)→ 0 Pθ0-a.s. of the following form:
ρt(X) = − ess sup{m ∈ L∞t |m ≤ X}.
That this sequence from all properties assumed in Proposition 4.6.7 is only
missing continuity from below (here equivalent to weak compactness of priors)
can be seen in the following way: Let t be arbitrary but fixed and X defined
by virtue of
X(ω) =
{
0 for ω ∈ (0, (2t − 1)2−t],
1 else.
Then we can construct a sequence (Xn)n, Xn ↗ X, such that ρt(Xn) = 0
for all n but ρt(X) = −X 6= 0. This shows (ρt)t not being continuous from
below.
Now we still have to show that for this construction the statement of our
proposition is not fulfilled. To verify this look at a set A assumed to be
F := σ(⋃t≥0Ft)-measurable such that Pθ0 [A] > 0 and Pθ0 [Ac ∩ Jt,k] 6= 0 for
all t and k. For this set, it holds
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣ρt(1A)− EPθ0 [−1A |Ft]∣∣∣ = lim
t→∞
∣∣0 + Pθ0 [A |Ft]∣∣ = Pθ0 [A] > 0
and hence necessity of the continuity assumption is shown.
The skeptical reader might now object that such a set A might not exist.
For sake of completeness we briefly quote a set A from [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
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that satisfies our assumptions: Let A be defined by virtue of its complement
A :=
( ∞⋃
t=1
2t−1⋃
k=1
Ut(k2
−t)
)c
,
where Ut denotes the t-neighborhood and t ∈]0, 2−2t].
4.8.3 A Non Time-Consistent Example
Here, we consider the entropic learning model introduced in Definition 4.4.6
explicitly in terms of Ω = ⊗tSt. Let Pθ denote the distribution induced by
θ = (θt)t, θt inducing a marginal distribution in M(St). Though the model
looks quite similar to dynamic entropic risk measures, we briefly recall it: Let
the robust representation of a dynamic convex risk measure (ρˆt)t be given by
virtue of the penalty
αˆmint (θ) := δHˆt(Pθ|Pθˆ),
δ > 0 and θˆ = (θˆt)t be achieved as in Definition 4.4.5: for t ∈ N, θˆt is the
maximum likelihood estimator of the foregoing observations and θˆi := θˆt for
i > t. Restricting ourselves to the iid case, we know that we achieve θˆt → θ¯0,
Pθ0-a.s., where θ0 = (θ¯0)t for some θ¯0 inducing a marginal distribution in
M(St). By definition, (ρˆt)t is a dynamic convex risk measure. As shown
in Proposition 4.4.15, (ρˆt)t is not time-consistent. By standard results on
conditional entropic risk measures, (ρˆt)t is continuous from below.
Furthermore, Proposition 4.7.7 is applicable and hence, our generaliza-
tion of Blackwell-Dubins’ theorem holds for experience based entropic risk.
Indeed: By definition of the penalty and our considerations in Section 4.8.1,
αˆmint (θ) → 0 as t → ∞ for all θ ∈ Θ. Secondly, as the maximum likelihood
estimator is asymptotically stable, i.e. θˆt → θ¯0, the conditional reference
distributions Pθˆ(·|Ft) converge. Thus, the worst case instantaneous distribu-
tions Pθ∗t converge as in Definition 4.7.1 due to continuity of the entropy and
as the effective domain of the penalty is given by conditional distributions, a
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fact that is made particularly precise in [Maccheroni et al., 06b].7
4.9 Conclusions
The major contribution of our results is to carry over the famous Blackwell-
Dubins theorem from probability distributions to convex risk measures. It is
particularly striking that the results still hold when time-consistency is not
posed as an assumption.
Hereto, the present article is twofold: In the first part, we show that
explicitly constructing dynamic convex risk measures by virtue of a penalty
emerging from a learning mechanism and inserted in the robust represen-
tation of convex risk measures leads to time-consistency problems. In the
second part, we have then assumed a time-consistent dynamic convex risk
measure for granted and asked the question of limit behavior; more elabo-
rately its convergence to the expected value under the true underlying dis-
tribution.
We therefore introduced a generalization of the famous Blackwell-Dubins
theorem on “Merging of Opinions” to conditional expected values. Existence
of a worst case distribution due to continuity from below and time-consistency
then allowed for a further generalization to coherent and convex risk mea-
sures. In particular, we have obtained the existence of the limiting risk
measure ρ∞ in that case.
By virtue of a counterexample, we have shown necessity of continuity
from below for our result. However, we have shown that time-consistency
is not necessary for the result to hold. In particular, we have obtained
a more general existence result for the limiting risk measure ρ∞ than in
[Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]. Our generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem
7The notation is quite misleading at this point: the worst case instantaneous distribu-
tions Pθ∗t ∈ Me(Pθ0) as in Definition 4.7.1 is a distribution on (Ω,F) as θ∗t is an element
of Θ and not a “marginal” parameter as the above θts.
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was shown to be equivalent to the notion of the parameter being eventually
learned upon and the notion of asymptotic precision in [Fo¨llmer & Penner, 06]
in the time-consistent case.
Further research should be conducted in the direction of our results.
First, of course, the riddle of explicitly constructing convex risk measures
by virtue of the penalty function is still to solve; in particular, how a learn-
ing mechanism might be introduced without destroying the assumption of
time-consistency. Weaker notions of time-consistency that are satisfied in
a “learning” environment should be introduced along with a comprehensive
theory allowing for solutions of tangible economic and social problems.
In the article at hand, we have considered risky projects with final payoffs,
i.e. random variables of the form X ∈ F . We have shown convergence of con-
vex risk measures to the conditional expected value with respect to the true
underlying distribution: a generalization of the Blackwell-Dubins theorem to
(not necessarily time-consistent) convex risk measures for final payoffs. To
us it seems being an interesting, yet challenging, task to generalize our result
to the case of convex risk measures for stochastic payoff processes (Xt)t with
respect to some filtration (Ft)t, where each Xt denotes the stochastic payoff
in period t. [Cheridito et al., 06] introduce dynamic convex risk measures for
these stochastic processes and elaborately discuss time-consistency issues but
do not inspect limiting behavior. A major difficulty in the case of stochastic
processes is that the assumption of equivalent distributions should be re-
placed by local equivalence, cp. [Riedel, 09]. Hence, the main question turns
out to be if the result still holds assuming local instead of global equivalence
as done here.
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Chapter 5
Closing Remarks
Within the three chapters of this thesis we have studied several problems
arising in the context of dynamic decision problems under Knightian Uncer-
tainty. Each chapter discusses its respective topic in detail and ends with
a conclusion summarizing its results. Nevertheless for completeness we will
briefly restate our achievements at this point:
First, we presented an alternative characterization for time-consistent sets
of measures on finite trees. It allows to express our set of measures through a
set of predictable processes which in return again defines a time-consistent set
of measures. This representation is unique up to the choice of a martingale
basis. Trying to generalize our assumptions in standard ways in order to
achieve a more universal representation failed, showing the scope of this
characterization.
In the third chapter we studied if and under what conditions a duality
theorem for optimal stopping problems holds in the multiple priors framework
of [Epstein & Schneider, 03]. The result is a minimax theorem for rather
general assumptions on the payoff process and standard assumptions on the
set of measures. We use this theorem to identify the worst case measure in
the setting of κ-ambiguity adapted to our framework and apply it to multiple
prior super- and submartingales determining the optimal stopping times.
5. CLOSING REMARKS
Finally, we have considered dynamic convex risk measures when infor-
mation is gathered in course of time. We have generalized the fundamental
Blackwell-Dubins theorem from [Blackwell & Dubins, 62] to not necessarily
time-consistent dynamic convex risk measures and have thus shown their con-
vergence to conditional expected values with respect to the true underlying
distribution: Intuitively the result shows that uncertainty vanishes but risk
endures.
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